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We present the first available - and near-complete - list of large UK 
manufacturers in 1881, by complementing the employer data from that 
year’s population census (recovered by the British Business Census of 
Entrepreneurs project) with employment and capital estimates from other 
sources. The 438 largest firms with 1,000 or more employees accounted for 
around one-sixth of manufacturing output. Examples can be found in most 
industries. Exploiting powered machinery, intangible assets, new 
technologies and venture capital, and generally operating in competitive 
markets, their exports about equalled domestic sales. The more capital-
intensive accessed stock markets, more - and in larger firms - than in 
follower economies. Some alleged later causes of UK decline relative to the 
US or Germany cannot be observed in 1881. Indeed, contemporary overseas 
observers - capitalist and socialist - correctly recognized the distinctive 
features of UK manufacturing as its exceptional development of quoted 




“The more I become acquainted with the astonishing resources of English 
manufacturers, their perseverance, their enterprise and their wealth, the more I am 
impressed with the feeling that we have a long and hard race yet to run before we 
surpass them in commercial pursuits.” 
Albert D Shaw, US Consul, Manchester, report to State Department, 15 July 1882 
  
Shortly after Shaw delivered this judgment, the Royal Commission on the 
Depression examined widespread business concerns about British performance. 
 
• Thanks to James Foreman-Peck, David Edgerton, members of the BBCE team and participants 
in a Reading seminar for comments on earlier versions and to numerous industry experts who 
generously assisted with estimating data missing from census returns. The usual dispensation 




Saul judged these to be overblown reactions to a depression that was largely 
confined to prices and agricultural output and Feinstein Matthews and Odling-
Smee confirmed there were sectoral labour productivity differences within 
overall GDP changes, with any GDP slowdown driven by manufacturing confined 
to the years after 1899.1 However, others have recently insisted that the 
“climacteric” in economic growth relative to earlier performance is appropriately 
dated to the 1870s, with total factor productivity increases peaking in 1856-73 
then falling back.2 Their calculations relate to GDP as a whole, weighted to data 
from the income and expenditure sides, the output side (showing less slowdown) 
being considered less reliable.3  For US/UK manufacturing comparisons, 
Broadberry’s backward extrapolations of output and employment levels 
intriguingly suggested that US labour productivity was already well ahead in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, prompting thoughtful re-examination of 
some of the alleged causes.4  
  
Long before these assessments, leading business historians confidently blamed 
late Victorian Britain’s rooted technical and managerial conservatism for 
severely limiting manufacturing scale and scope, relative to the US and 
Germany.5 Our purpose here is not further to re-hash national income 
aggregates, but to open fresh perspectives by providing data on the 
microeconomics of UK manufacturing in 1881: measuring what had already been 
achieved by large enterprises, to provide benchmarks against which to evaluate 
later alleged performance shortfalls. Historians of nineteenth century business 
routinely regret the absence of a UK Census of Production before 1907, as did 
Victorian statisticians, with sectoral employment analyses relying on individual 
(not employer) returns, which officials considered “the least satisfactory part of 
the Census.”6 Factory Inspectors’ reports track progressively larger plants but 
 
1 Saul, Myth; Feinstein et al, ‘Timing.’ 
2 Crafts and Mills, ‘Sooner;’ Crafts, ‘Understanding.’  
3 Solomou and Thomas, ‘Feinstein.’ 
4 Broadberry, Productivity; see also Field, ‘Unimportance.’ 
5 Aldcroft (‘Entrepreneur’) provided a clear but nuanced prosecution case, whose main criticisms 
on scale and ownership Chandler (Scale) influentially amplified. 
6 Registrar-General, Census, p. 25. Woollard ‘Classification’ and others are more positive.  
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have only partial (and changing) coverage of sectors and businesses. In contrast 
US decennial manufacturing censuses provide a more richly detailed 
quantitative record, recording hands employed, capital, motive power and 
output; breakdowns by establishment size were published from 1900 and for 
1850-80 can be reconstructed from manuscript returns.7 German, French and 
Belgian censuses published information on the size range of businesses (by 
employment) in more sectors and earlier. However, exceptionally, for the four 
decennial population censuses of 1851-81, UK enumerators promisingly gathered 
information on firm size by asking business owners how many they employed. 
Yet no adequate tabulations were published, and the question was abandoned in 
the 1891 census. Clapham made the best he could of the results published for 
1851.8  
  
Two new research tools facilitate the more ambitious approach developed here. 
First, the British Business Census of Entrepreneurs (BBCE) database, using Big 
Data techniques to process the millions of original records, identifies employers 
in the original census manuscript returns.9 This is a counterpart to the US 
census of manufactures, but only for employee numbers. From this we have 
selected all manufacturers returning 1,000 or more employees in 1881. Previous 
research using the BBCE, focused on the number of entrepreneurs, required 
adjustment for non-responses to the employer question, transcriptions errors, 
and lost returns.10 The unique firm size data exploited here were especially 
problematic because large firms, particularly those incorporated, were found to 
be least likely to respond;11 and the largest corporate employers, railways, made 
no census returns.12  
 
7 Atack and Bateman, ‘Nineteenth century.’ Jeremy Atack and Richard Hornbeck generously 
shared their unpublished databases of US 1880 manuscript returns.  
8 Economic History, p. 35. Even the published tabulations were somewhat imperfect, especially 
for larger firms (van Lieshout et al, ‘British Business’).  
9 Bennett et al, British Business; idem, Age. Data guide and publications using BBCE at 
www.bbce.uk. 
10 Bennett et al ‘Population;’ Bennett et al, ‘Changes.’  
11 Bennett and Hannah, ‘British employer.’ 
12 Separately in 1884 (Board of Trade, “Railways’) the largest railway reported 55,061 employees, 
mainly operating transport services. We include only 41,119 manufacturing employees in 13 
large railway-owned workshops, anticipating later production census practice.  
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We resolved this issue using a second set of resources: newly searchable 
databases of contemporary newspapers and parliamentary papers, infilling for 
British non-responders and for the Irish census records (which were largely 
destroyed) to cover the whole UK.13 Strikes, boiler explosions and factory fires 
(not infrequent occurrences) often resulted in press reports of numbers of 
employees affected. Numerous factory visits by engineering institutes, factory 
inspectors, royal commissions, parliamentary select committees, journalists and 
foreign dignitaries also elicited employment data, which we searched using 
terms like “largest factory” and “000 hands.” Census returns relate to 4 April 
1881 and other sources to various dates from which approximations for the 
spring of 1881 can be interpolated. Combining sources produced the list of 438 
UK manufacturing employers with 1,000 or more employees reported here. 
Census returns identified half of these.14 Additions backfilled from 
supplementary sources risk hindsight bias, but we compensated by tracking 
forward several hundred firms making large employment returns to the 
1851/61/71 censuses and three Royal Commissions (1867 on Trade Unions, 1868 
on River Pollution and 1871 on Truck), identifying firms failing to make an 1881 
return but remaining large. 
  
In this paper we focus on manufacturers (a sector prominent in the literature on 
productivity achievements/shortcomings) in the last year that the employment 
question featured in the population census: 1881. After the end of the mid-
Victorian boom (conventionally dated 1856-73), 1881 provides a suitable 
benchmark of its achievements, albeit possibly already slightly tarnished by the 
early-onset climacteric sometimes alleged. It is also a clear generation before the 
1907 production census, a widely used later benchmark of problematic 
comparative performance. The BBCE already indicates the manufacturing 
 
13 British Library Newspapers online are constantly expanding, searches made up to June 2021; 
British Parliamentary Papers were already fully searchable online, with the usual qualifications 
about OCR errors.  
14 35% of the total from 1881 returns; others from earlier censuses identifying likely large 
employers failing to return. 
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sector’s increasing concentration in larger firms (for the firms it covered),15 and 
the great bulk of large BBCE returns were for manufacturers.16  
  
These new data enhancing the BBCE offer a new framework for understanding 
the UK’s largest firms and their performance. The following section charts their 
growing weight in the UK economy. Next, we assess their contribution by 
industry, by capital and by stock exchange finance, then survey more 
fragmentary evidence on their production techniques, management, intangible 
assets and productivity. The conclusion considers feasible elaborations of these 
research techniques. All 438 firms with 1,000 or more employees are identified in 
Appendix 1, with additional material on 1871-81 in Appendix 2 and two further 
methodological appendixes available on request from the corresponding author. 
 
 
Large Manufacturing Employers of 1881 
Census returns derive from the instruction “in trades, manufactures or other 
business masters must, in all cases, be so designated, inserting always the 
number of workpeople in their employ at the time of the Census.” Returners 
(usually household heads) and census examiners were asked to report domestic 
and farm servants separately (excluded from our totals) and to include all 
employees, though partners and some directors were not technically employees, 
and other white-collar employees may in some cases be omitted. We have (a few 
egregious mistakes apart) respected the numbers in census returns, from 
knowledgeable contemporaries answering a standard question on a fixed day. 
Outworkers - common especially in clothing - were excluded by many returners 
from “workpeople in their employ” but are included for some firms and 
standardisation is impracticable. Overseas employees would logically be 
excluded from a national census and cases where they were not, have largely 
been adjusted to conform. Partners, instructed to make only one return, 
 
15 Bennett et al, Age, pp. 125-32. 
16 Mining constituted most large 1881 returns not analysed here (mines are included only if 
owned by manufacturing firms). Agriculture, distribution, construction, finance and professional 
services made few or no ≥1,000 employee returns. 
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sometimes duplicated returns, which are removed. Some widely cited 
contemporary sources resorted to puffery and have been discounted unless 
corroborated by other sources; others reporting fewer or more employees than 
the census have been ignored. Proprietors rarely specified firm names: these are 
identified from sources like the Dictionary of Business Biography, the Directory 
of Directors and contemporary newspapers.  Only 13% of managers of 
incorporated enterprises employing ≥1,000 responded, so supplementary sources 
for corporations were essential,17 whereas slightly over half of unincorporated 
enterprises made returns.  
 
Measuring size by employee numbers biases toward labour-intensive firms, 
excluding some more efficient firms.18 Its attraction - apart from being the only 
measure in census returns - is that a person is a person (in silk and steel, in 
Galway and Glasgow, in 1851 and 1881).  Yet that egalitarian principle may 
sometimes mislead. Full-timers produced more than part-timers, and adults 
more than juniors (especially children under 13, working only half-time while 
attending school). Suggestions that Irish produced less than Scots or women less 
than men (though self-evident if wages reflected marginal productivities) raise 
more difficult issues. In much 19th century labour, the role of sweat and muscle 
was reflected in higher male wages, while firms deploying more mechanical aids 
often increased female recruitment, with women accounting for most textile 
employment. Aggregating males and females by the compensation-weighting 
convention (counting a woman as two-thirds a man19) would reduce the 
proportion of firms in textiles and clothing in this list.  
 
Many returns were rounded to the nearest hundred and should be considered 
estimates; rankings of firms with modestly differing totals should not be over-
 
17 We identified only four returns that related to large corporations with a major stock exchange 
listing and numerous holders, but others were readily identified from stock exchange directories. 
18 It includes several Irish shirt manufacturers employing thousands of out-working 
seamstresses, while several integrated factories in Oldham - whose highly paid machine 
operators produced cotton cloth with fewer workers than the national average per spindle and 
loom - fell slightly below the 1,000-employee cut-off.  
19 Levi, Wages, pp.19-21. 
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interpreted. Employers of 1,000 or more naturally encountered problems 
radically different from the small employer but did not resolve them uniformly. 
Indeed, their diverse capabilities - sometimes driving and sometimes inhibiting 
further growth – might be used in future analysis to support competing theories 
of the causes of rising factory employment at scale.20 Some of the businessmen21 
making returns had multiple business interests. Where they had multiple 
shareholdings/partnerships, comparison with more granular sources suggests 
they normally reported the entity that they considered their main business 
(including employees in all UK plants and branches), but a few grouped related 
firms. Press reports sometimes relate to individual factories, as did a few census 
returns, but, where the firm owned more, we have estimated additions to mimic 
the enterprise level of the typical census return. 
 
The figures are thus generally for firms, not plants. Firms accessed wider scale 
and scope economies: buying power, reputation, patents, advertising, designers, 
tacit knowledge, laboratories, specialist managers, shared distribution networks 
and so on. Similarly, in US censuses plants in the same city or county under 
common ownership in the same industry were defined as one “establishment.” By 
that definition the single-establishment firms in this list would be about half the 
total and the number of manufacturing establishments per multi-plant firm was 
in low single figures. 
  
The results are summarized in Table 1. There were 438 manufacturing firms 
employing 1,000 or more, averaging 2,143 employees each, with a median of 
1,500. The distribution is skewed: 33 “giant” firms (employing 5,000 or more) 
accounted for over a quarter of all large firm employees. Most people worked in 
enterprises well below our threshold size; overall mean employment per firm was 
fewer than 8, much as today. There were more firms employing ≥1,000 in 
 
20 Among those proposed in the literature are technological non-separability, labour discipline, 
transaction costs, asset-specificity, network dysfunction, market size, expertise-sharing and 
inertia. 
21 All large returners in 1881 were men. Earlier some young widows who had helped run their 
husband’s firm and opted to continue were large employers.  
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manufacturing in 1881 than today, but today’s on average employ 61% more 
people; their share in manufacturing employment has risen from 16% in 1881 to 
27%.22 This was accompanied by growth in plants per firm; by the later 20th 
century the average top 100 UK manufacturer operated 72 plants.23 There was 
no Unilever in 1881 (the founding Lever brothers still helped manage their 
father’s Bolton wholesale grocery employing 22). Our firms were chiefly 
concerned with managing their core business, not juggling portfolios of diverse 
subsidiaries as in such later conglomerate behemoths. Otherwise, the 
manufacturing firm size distribution was already much the same as today.24  
 






Number of Employees Mean employees per firm 










33 237,746 155,075 7,204 4,699 
1,000-4,999 405 701,037 627,066 1,731 1,548 
≤1,000 438 938,7783 782,137 2,143 1,786 
0-999 649,562 n/a 4,077,863 n/a <7 
UK 
Manufacturing 
650,000 n/a 4,860,000 n/a <8 
 
Source: worksheets of the present study. We have estimated the total number of manufacturing 
firms from the partial coverage of BBCE plus an allowance for Ireland. Firms with zero 
employees are self-employed manufacturers with no employees, accounting for about 70% of 
manufacturing firms but less than 9% of the manufacturing workforce. For total manufacturing 
employment we have deducted slightly more than 1% from Feinstein’s (National Income, p. T131) 
4.92m to allow for occupational returns by people who were unemployed at the census date and 
added 22,000 for gas employees (whom Feinstein excludes from manufacturing). The resulting 
4.86m total manufacturing employment figure is also the figure in Lewis (Growth, p. 265) which 
we have used for manufacturing employment at other dates. Earlier estimates (including Booth, 
‘Occupations’) were lower, clustering around 4.5m.   
 
 
22 In 2019 there were slightly more than 2.5m manufacturing employees, fewer than in 1881, see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/business/activitysizeandlocation/adhocs/12035
manufacturingenterprisesandlocalunitsbyemploymentsize. UK manufacturing employment and 
the numbers and share of ≥1,000 firms peaked at higher levels in the 1960s and 1970s (Zeitlin, 
‘Why,’ pp. 103-5). 
23 Prais, Evolution, pp. 85-6. Even after multi-firm merger waves had created 8 firms with ≥20 
plants, Shaw (‘Large,’ p. 48) estimates the mean number of plants among top 100 manufacturing 
employers at six and the median at three. 
24 For example, 199,000 (7.8%) of the 2,555,000 UK manufacturing employees of 2020 were self-
employed compared with 7.1% (plus Irish self-employed) in 1881 and the sub-1000 size ranges 
were much the same as in Bennett and Hannah, ‘British employer.’  
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The adjustments in the third column attempt to remove non-manufacturing 
employees from the reported employee numbers where sources allow. Although 
this is imperfect, the contrasts highlight that the largest firms of 1881 were more 
vertically integrated than smaller firms: backwards to raw material supplies 
(dominated by iron and steel giants owning coal, iron ore and limestone mines) 
and forwards to wholesale warehouses and distribution (mainly textile and 
clothing manufacturers).  
 
The largest firms’ share in employment may - as more recently - understate 
these employers’ share in output and, a fortiori, the share of large firms ordered 
by output size. Apart from economies of scale, larger firms potentially accessed 
more learning-by-doing and divisions of labour (including more specialised 
management), cheaper transport (through private rail sidings and river or ocean 
access) and better internal and external financing, all possibly improving 
productivity. It will be noted later that large employers were also more capital-
intensive and had developed significant intangible assets such as patents, 
designs and brands; many also paid higher wages than the national average and 
sometimes a little above the going rates for their locality and favoured 
apprenticeships and other on-the-job training.25 We lack output data, but for all 
these reasons their overall share in value-added was probably somewhat higher 
than their share in employment: they perhaps accounted for a sixth of 
manufacturing output by value or more.26  
 
Calculating aggregate concentration ratios for time series comparisons is not 
straightforward, given uncertainties in defining both numerator and 
denominator. Census returns of 1851-81 (albeit only a subset of totals) suggest a 
steadily rising share of large employers, as firms grew both by merger and by 
reinvesting profits, increasing divisions of labour, use of machine technology and 
learning-by-doing. Several dozen large companies of 1881 – notably in gas, rail 
 
25 More, Skill. 
26 The 1907 production census noted higher labour productivity in industries dominated by large 
firms, or selling proprietary or patented articles (Census, Final Report, pp. 13-14). 
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engineering, and iron/steel - also had a record of acquisitions. This early merger 
wave has been somewhat overshadowed by the multi-firm merger waves of 1888-
90 and 1896-1900, in sectors relatively untouched by the earlier wave but often 
led by firms which were already large in 1881, such as Bazley White in 
Associated Portland Cement or Houldsworth in Fine Cotton Spinners.  Focusing 
on the conventional top 100 firms for measuring aggregate concentration, their 
share of all manufacturing employees rose from 6.3% in 1871 to 7.3% in 1881, 
while comparison with Shaw’s data for 1907 suggests a further rise to around 
11% in the next generation.27   
 
 
Industrial Distribution and Concentration Levels 
In Table 2 we have classified these businesses by sector. They were 
overwhelmingly in the classic mechanized industries using the general-purpose 
technology of steam power. More large firms (58%) were in consumer goods 
(textiles, clothing, shoes, food, drink, consumer durables) than capital goods 
(building materials, machinery, ships, railway equipment and metal inputs to 
such goods).28  However, capital goods firms accounted for just over half of all 
large-firm employees, much more than the one-fifth for UK manufacturing 
employees overall. 22 of the top 25 employers were producing capital goods. 
Having in 1843 abandoned largely fruitless attempts to restrict exports of 
leading-edge machines, UK businesses were now driving globalisation by 
building the transport networks and workshops of the world, accounting for 63% 
of world exports of capital goods.29 The range of machinery – not only widely-
used looms, locomotives, ships, printing presses and steam engines, but 
specialist items like tunnel borers, rubber mixers, horseless carriages, wire 
extruders and biscuit cutters – was extraordinary.30 Chandler’s suggestion that 
 
27 Shaw, ’Large.’  In each case using occupational census data as the denominator (Lewis, 
Growth, p. 265) with interpolation for 1907. For the 1871 top 100 compiled on a similar basis to 
1881, and a list of 1860s and 1870s mergers of large firms see Appendix 2. 
28 This division is necessarily approximate and products like sewing machines and road vehicles 
were both consumer and investment goods. 
29 Saul, ‘Export,’ p. 16. 
30 Hunt, Ure’s Dictionary. 
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“In machinery the British did not even try”31 from the 1880s to 1913 - not 
seriously sustainable in 1913 - is plainly absurd in 1881. 
 
Table 2. Large UK Manufacturing Firms and Concentration by Industry 1881. 
 
 Firms employing ≥1,000    
     Concentration 








5 ≥1000 6 top 3 
Iron and Steela 84 143,012 1,704 450,000 32% 3% 
Shipbuilding/Marine 
Engineering 
31 77,610 2,504 107,000 73% 25% 
Railway Engineering 28 63,965 2,284 100,000 64% 21% 
Textile Machinery 13 25,300 1,946 50,000 51% 23% 
Other Engineeringb 17 31,372 1,845 100,000 31% 13% 
Cotton 84 140,818 1,676 540,000 26% 3% 
Wool/Worsted 27 37,268 1,380 265,000 14% 3% 
Linen, flax, jute 37 69,758 1,885 140,000 50% 10% 
Silk, lace, carpets, 
oilcloth 
17 27,007 1,589 138,000 20% 7% 
Textile 
finishing/dyeworks* 
12 17,546 1,462 103,000 17% 6% 
Gas/coke/chemical 
byproducts* 
6 10,858 1,810 22,000 49% 37% 
Other chemicals 16 24,494 1,531 82,000 30% 10% 
Bricks, pottery, glass, 
cement 
9 15,902 1,766 138,000 12% 6% 
Paper, printing, books 12 18,007 1,501 193,000 9% 4% 
Clothing 23 48,235 2,097 925,000 5% 2% 
Footwear 5 7,889 1,577 275,000 3% 2% 
Food/drink/tobacco 17 23,006 1.353 611,000 4% 1% 
Industries with no 
large firmsc 
0 0 0 621,000 0% n/a 
Total manufacturing 438 775,334 1,774 4,860,000 16% 1% 
 
Sources. Cols 1-3, present study. Col 2 is based on col 3 of Table 1 (it excludes employees of 
manufacturing firms in mining and services).  
Col 4. authors’ estimates, see Appendix 3 (available from corresponding author).  
Col 5. calculated from cols 2 and 4; col 6 from present study’s worksheets and col 4.  
*These three sectors shared some features, including extensive employment of chemists. Textile 
finishers manufactured some of the dyes they used, and gas was then manufactured from coal, 
alongside extensive coke, oil and chemical by-products. We have treated gas undertakings as 
manufacturers, deferring to nineteenth century practice (Booth, ‘Occupations’), not as utilities. 
Our “other chemicals” sector also includes three copper refiners who produced chemical  by-
products. 
ᵃ including some simple final products (e.g. cutlery, files, saws, chains, wire, screws and other 
fixings) whose manufacture was sometimes integrated with iron/steel production.  
ᵇ including agricultural engineering, machine tools, non-transport steam engines, telegraph 
cables, Bessemer converters etc. 




31 Chandler, ‘Managerial Enterprise,’ p. 22; compare Saul, ‘Market,’ Foreman-Peck, ‘Balance.’ 
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We have tried to align estimates of employment in all manufacturing firms in 
column 4 of Table 2 with our data for large firms in the first three columns, but 
they are necessarily approximations. Nonetheless the broad results of this 
exercise are plausible.32 There are only five industries in which large employers 
may - within the margins of error of the data - account for most of a sector’s 
employment: shipbuilding, railway engineering, textile machinery, coal 
gasification and linen (col 5). The two industries with most large firms – 
iron/steel and cotton - were also massive employers, so less than a third of their 
employees were in large firms.  
 
There were 24 large employers in clothing, but this sector had many thousands 
of firms with approaching a million employees, so concentration was low. 
Mechanical band-knives from the 1860s cut multiple identical cloth or leather 
pieces in standard sizes for uniforms, gloves, shoes, corsets, men’s suits or shirts. 
They were finished not only by steam-driven sewing machines in factories but by 
homeworkers operating treadle machines, giving outworkers a new lease of life,33 
and for some fine work on lace or linen embroidery hand needlework survived. 
Much the same was true in hosiery where circular machines knitted “tubes,” but 
hand finishers still closed and “fully fashioned” some stockings. Moreover, 
649,527 dressmakers, milliners and tailors made individual occupational census 
returns (70% of clothing employees) and few of them worked in factories: many 
were self-employed, selling bespoke rather than standard lines, or working by 
hand or treadle machine in small shops. Similarly, food manufacturing was 
mainly populated by small businesses (grain millers, slaughterhouses) and self-
employed maker-dealers (bakers, butchers). Large employers mass producing 
biscuits in continuous baking ovens (Huntley & Palmer, Peek Frean) or selling 
branded preserves in cans and bottles (Crosse & Blackwell, Colman Mustard) 
were exceptions.  
 
32 For example, the exceptionally comprehensive Factory Inspectors’ returns for 1870 show 
shipbuilding with the highest average factory size, while their 1878 and 1885 textile returns 
show woollen mills smaller than others. 




At the other end of the scale, the highest 3-firm concentration ratio (37%) was in 
local regulated monopolies supplying piped gas, yet they competed with many 
other suppliers of lighting and by-products (coke and chemicals). The mean 3-
firm concentration ratio in col 6 is under 10%, though concentration, of course, 
increases with the fineness of classification. Platts accounted for 12% of textile 
machinery employment but in the following decades it supplied 87% of cotton 
spindles installed in Japan34 and its share in Oldham was not much smaller. 
Other more narrowly-defined industries - warships, window glass, 
screws/nuts/bolts, envelopes or steel pens – were contestable oligopolies, though 
competition was weak where there were vertical restraints.35 This was not an 
economy in equilibrium, but in a constant ferment of change: able to generate 
both the innovative variety and the selection forces that drove evolutionary 
success. Apparently entrenched incumbent firms could not easily prevent rivals’ 
expansion: Fothergill & Hankey (which returned 8,000 employees in 1871) was 
bankrupt by 1875 but rival iron and steel firms with more successful financial, 
technical and labour strategies had replaced the output of its derelict South 
Wales blast furnaces.36 Eleven others among the 326 firms that had employed 
1,000 or more in 1871 no longer existed by 1881; many more had declined in size, 
but there was a net gain of 112 large firms and the 1881 firms were on average 
larger. With vigorous competitive assortment within a growing economy, a more 
integrated national market than Germany or the USA, and the UK’s distinctive 
disavowal of protective tariffs, it is implausible to assert that any lacklustre 
manufacturing performance in 1881 derived from “lack of competition in product 
markets  and the relative absence of creative destruction as disciplinary 
mechanisms to promote the efficiency of firms”37 as more reasonably suspected of 
1950.38 Indeed, late Victorian Britain was arguably the most competitive 
economy the world had ever seen, a poster child (like the US in the late 
 
34 Saxonhouse. ‘Tale,’ p. 162. 
35 Government restraints on printing and armaments competition had dissipated, but the largest 
railway engineering works were owned by railway companies, which - following an 1876 court 
decision - were barred selling to third parties; their parent railways allocated few orders to 
outsiders. 
36 Riden and Owen, British, pp. 1-2, 23. 
37 Nicholas, ‘Technology,’ p. 182. 
38 Broadberry, Productivity, p. 157; Lazonick, Business Organization. 
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twentieth century) for the competition policy now recommended by neo-
Schumpeterians for economies at the technological frontier.39 
 
British industrial dominance was, of course, long-established and these firms - 
like rivals overseas - were mainly turning out old products, albeit with modern 
improvements and sometimes profound transformative effects. The Butterley 
Company (ranked 11th by employment) - the leading maker of iron girders 
spanning rivers and roofing modern buildings - was a partnership organised in 
1807; its Derbyshire ironworks had first manufactured iron rails in 1792 (1,000 
miles of horse-drawn railways pre-dating the first steam locomotive). Platt 
(ranked 15th) - the world’s leading textile machinery maker - started 
manufacturing in Oldham in 1821. The LNWR’s railway works (ranked 9th) 
opened in 1843, thirteen years after a constituent firm offered the world’s first 
steam passenger rail service. Acids, chlorine, and (Leblanc) soda were produced 
by Tennants (of Glasgow and Tyneside, founded 1788 and ranked 98th by 1881) 
and these and superphosphate fertiliser, gunpowder and rubber by other mature 
chemical firms. Few producers of “modern” chemicals – Solvay soda or artificial 
dyestuffs – employed 1,000+ in 1881 and they were respectively French or 
German: Britain was catching up with France’s Dombasle (and outstripping 
Deutsche Solvay) in soda but falling further behind in dyestuffs; the US was 
then hors de combat, importing most such modern chemicals from Europe.40 
 
However, large UK firms were no slouches in other “new” industries that had 
more substantially developed in the previous two decades and were 
acknowledged by contemporaries as transformational and “modern.”41 Electricity 
 
39 Aghion, Power, p. 61. 
40 BASF, a leading German dyeworks, already employed 1,140 (including 17 chemists) in 1876 
(Abelshauser et al, German Industry, pp. 102-3). Brunner Mond (the British Solvay licensee) 
returned only 594 employees in 1881, but soon employed over 1,000, as its output caught up with 
Solvay in France, the other large “modern” chemical producer (Bertrams et al, Solvay, p. 53). 
Dynamite – another “modern” chemical – achieved giant scale after Alfred Nobel and his Scots 
collaborators engineered the merger of British and German producers into a UK-headquartered 
trust in 1886. 
41 Our definition of ‘new’ is one of several possible. Bairoch (“International,’ p. 288) estimated 
that ca 1880 64-72% of UK manufacturing output - compared with only 30-38% in other 
developed countries - was in ‘new technology’ industries (by which he meant the main drivers of 
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was used in lighting, electroplating and telegraphy, mainly in 1881 the latter. 
The largest firms manufactured submarine telegraph cables, extending the 
overhead wires of national land networks to build the first worldwide web. Three 
Thames-based companies, each employing around 2,000, manufacturing cables 
and operating seagoing cable-layers, were larger than any overseas rival: India 
Rubber, Gutta Percha & Telegraph Works, Telegraph Construction & 
Maintenance (which had in 1876 acquired local competitor Henley), both 
incorporated in 1864, and Siemens Brothers, in 1880.42 The big money in 
electricals - after the 1870s boom in construction - was in operating telegraphs. 
Most of the 100,000 miles of submarine cables linking national telegraphs 
worldwide (transforming global trading, finance and headquarters control over 
shipping lines) were British-made and in the hands of large British telegraph 
companies. By 1881, the basic worldwide web was complete, but new orders for 
competitive routes remained strong and this section of the British electrical 
industry continued to prosper. 
 
Petroleum was another “new” industry: oil lamps challenged traditional lighting 
by candles, competing with producers in Asia (Russian Baku from 1846), Europe 
(Ottoman Romania from 1857) and the US (major Pennsylvania discoveries in 
1869), sourced from oil wells (which the UK lacked). Domestic oil was mainly 
distilled from cannel coal (shale). The pioneer (and still largest) UK firm, 
Young’s Paraffin Light & Mineral Oil Co, was incorporated in 1866 to take over 
partnerships exploiting the processing patent of the eponymous chemist, James 
Young, who had operated the world’s first commercial refinery in 1851. By 1881 
the company had invested £1m in three refineries in central Scotland, also 
making lubricating oil, paraffin wax, and oil lamps. With 2,500 employees, it 
ranked 90th= in the UK list and, though still smaller than gas lighting companies 
with some similar inputs and by-products, it had overtaken the 2,000 employees 
 
industrial growth, notably cotton, iron, steel and chemicals, rather than traditional textiles, 
clothing, foodstuffs, timber and furniture). 
42 In 1881 Siemens employed 1,418 in England and 675 in Germany and the largest (43.5%) 
share of Siemens Brothers was owned by Sir William Siemens, a naturalised Briton (Von Weiher, 
Siemens-Werke, pp. 95, 111 n 4; Feldenkirchen, Siemens, p. 162). 
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at Price’s Patent Candle, another lighting product that shared some raw 
material inputs. New shale rivals entered as Young’s patents expired, though the 
largest, Broxburn Oil, still only employed 869. Shale production more than 
tripled after 1881, but domestic processors had increasing difficulty meeting the 
prices of Standard, Burmah and Shell, importing petroleum extracted and 
refined in America and Asia.   
 
Other large firms in “new” industries mainly developed from established firms. 
In steel, an old product transformed by cheaper decarburising processes opening 
up new uses, some new companies were formed by inventors. The key Bessemer, 
Siemens and Gilchrist-Thomas steelmaking processes were all British 
inventions, and in the major early use the UK converted from iron to steel rails 
faster than Germany or the US.43 Landore Siemens Steel was incorporated in 
1870 and by 1881 operated 24 Siemens furnaces, employing 2,800 in South 
Wales. In contrast, the Henry Bessemer & Co partnership was, from its 
formation in 1858 to the patent expiry in 1877, mainly a (highly profitable) 
licensing firm and in 1881 still employed fewer than 1,000 at its six Bessemer 
converters in Sheffield and Glasgow. Both Siemens and Bessemer operated non-
exclusively, licensing their technology widely, so existing ironworks with 
furnaces to feed the new steel converters could readily enter. The Dowlais Iron 
Co’s sixth generation of managers had by 1881 (with 8,750 employees) changed 
the balance from iron to steel and become Britain’s largest operator both of 
Bessemer converters and Siemens furnaces.44 The third new steelmaking 
process, Gilchrist-Thomas dephosphorisation, was initially developed by Percy 
Gilchrist (at the Blaenavon Co from 1876) then (when Blaenavon failed) used 
development facilities offered by Bolckow Vaughan (the largest employer in coal, 
iron and steel).  
 
Shipbuilding was a similarly vibrant new industry supplanting an old one, 
wooden sailing ships. The key innovations - widely applied only from the 1860s - 
 
43 Mulhall, Dictionary, p. 382. 
44 Meade, Coal and Iron. 
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were more fuel-efficient compound steam engines, high-pressure boilers, and 
screw propellers, almost exclusively developed by British marine engineers and 
naval architects. The first triple-expansion engine was installed by its inventor, 
Dr Alexander Kirk (of Napier shipyard on the Clyde) in 1874: he became senior 
partner in 1877 and employed around 2,000. At the same time new machines for 
cutting, bending and riveting iron facilitated the building of larger ships; steel 
ships did even better, carrying 20% more cargo than iron ships of equal size. Iron 
superseded wood in most UK ship construction by 1862, steel by 1886.45 In 1881 
UK shipyards built almost all the world’s steel steamships and launched perhaps 
90% of oceangoing steam merchant tonnage and warships (if sailing ships and 
paddle steamers in which other countries still specialized are included, around 
two-thirds). The mainly oceanic - and thus necessarily open – markets for 
modern ships offered few barriers to trade or investment (limiting foreign 
protectionism to navy purchases, subsidies and cabotage) and transport costs for 
delivering ships were essentially zero, so the UK dominated world supply, as in 
submarine cables with a similarly open oceanic market. 
  
Most foreign multinationals with British manufacturing plants in the nineteenth 
century failed or made poor profits.46 Only two qualified among our large firms 
in 1881,47 both US sewing machine manufacturers. Singer Manufacturing had in 
the 1860s established its foreign headquarters in London, applying US 
production techniques in a Glasgow factory, where it was in 1881 rebuilding to 
match the scale of Elizabethport, New Jersey. With around 4,250 UK employees, 
Singer already ranked 36th by employment, though most were in distribution, 
not manufacturing. Its retail shops inspired consumer confidence in this new, 
complex, consumer durable and its marketing leadership constituted the 
company’s distinctive competitive advantage, after its patents expired in 1877, 
halving prices. Singer’s share (around three-quarters of the global market) was 
 
45 Pollard and Robertson, Shipbuilding. 
46 Godley, ‘Pioneering.’ 
47 Among other US multinationals, the London factories of Robert Hoe (printing presses) and 
Westinghouse Brake (railway equipment) employed fewer than 1,000 in 1881 and Wheeler & 
Wilson (sewing machines) had withdrawn from the UK in 1879. On the nationality of Holden and 
Siemens ca 1881, see Appendix 2 and n. 42 above. 
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secured by its canvasser-collector financing system, key to promoting sales while 
disciplining overenthusiastic salesmen. Invented by the London branch, it was 
adopted later by the US parent: Singer was a genuine transnational with a two-
way flow of ideas and personnel.48 The Howe Machine Co (employing perhaps 
1,500 in its UK subsidiary, also with a Glasgow sewing machine factory) by 
contrast had a mindlessly boosterish approach and was soon bankrupt in both 
countries, while British-owned competitors still employed fewer than 1,000.  
 
Singer’s Scotland/US complementarity was matched in cotton sewing thread. 
Two Paisley firms, Coats and Clarks (in 1881 together employing 7,020 in 
Scotland and several thousand more in their US subsidiaries in New Jersey and 
Rhode Island), had global reach: sewing machinists valued quality thread brands 
for break-free operation. Applying Paisley manufacturing techniques in their US 
factories, the Scots dominated the American as well as European branded thread 
market and learned from US colleagues. These thread firms were to combine in 
1896, becoming Europe’s largest industrial, with double Singer’s market 
capitalisation, as the latter approached saturation (at least in English-speaking 
markets), two decades before thread. More generally, UK-headquartered firms 
led multinational development in 188149 and in terms of aggregate capital 
invested remained ahead of US, German and French multinationals (combined) 
as late as 1938.50 
 
The textile industries, accounting for 39% of large firm employees, were a classic 
outcome of the international division of labour promoted by free trade as 
industrialisation spread. In such basic industries (food and clothing accounted 
for most household expenditure worldwide), demand was inevitably growing 
faster in new overseas industrializers than in the rich UK with more 
discretionary expenditure. UK textile employment growth was slowing, although 
linen (in Ireland) and cotton (in Lancashire) were resilient. In 1881 cotton still 
 
48 Godley, ‘Selling.’ 
49 More than a dozen of our firms already manufactured overseas in 1881, see Appendix 2. 
50 Dunning and Lundon, Multinational Enterprises, p.174. 
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accounted for about half of nationwide textile employment. Export sales 
accounted for nine-tenths of the 5.35b yards of cotton cloth manufactured, most 
going to Asian countries just beginning to install British machinery in local 
factories.51 This was substantially an American product: raw cotton, most from 
US plantations, absorbed around two-fifths of UK cotton revenues. With modern 
textile technologies spreading to countries with lower wages (continental Europe) 
or longer working hours (the US), this globally exposed, unprotected industry 
could hardly have survived if it had failed to neutralize the high wages of 
Lancashire by exceptionally high productivity. 70 of the 84 large firms integrated 
spinning with weaving and, occasionally, dyeing and printing too52, but they 
controlled only about a quarter of UK capacity and new mills employing fewer 
than 1,000 remained competitive. Survivor analysis suggests scale around 1,000 
employees was a modest advantage (as, with some branding and exceptionally 
skilled managers, was even larger scale) but vertical integration less so: smaller 
firms specializing in one process readily accessed Marshallian external 
economies in the Lancashire industrial district.53  
 
Most large firms served national and export markets, even in sectors like 
brewing or clothing where producers generally served local markets. Indeed, in 
aggregate our large firms probably sold half their production abroad,54 many 
having sales offices in Paris, New York, Bombay, Sydney and other trading hubs. 
Others outsourced distribution to commission agents and wholesalers at home 





51 Mulhall, Dictionary, p. 114. 
52 Suggesting more integration than indicated by the 1885 Factory Inspectors’ returns, which 
treated some integrated firms as spinning- or weaving-only plants (our figures are for firms not 
plants). 
53 Leunig, ‘British Industrial Success;’ Broadberry and Marrison, ‘External Economies.’  
54 Lewis (Growth, p. 119) estimated 52% of UK manufacturing production was exported in 1873. 
Weighting industry-wide export percentages ca 1881 (Mulhall, Dictionary; Bartlett, Carpeting, p. 
66; Saul, ‘Export,’ p. 13; Anon, ‘Commercial’) by our large firm employees suggests they exported 
43% of their output, but large firms generally exported more than small. 
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Capital Intensity and Firm Finance 
Census returns reported only employee numbers, but data on invested capital 
exist for 284 of these large firms. Almost all public companies by 1881 published 
their paid-up capital (equities and fixed interest) in externally audited accounts. 
Less comprehensively - from archives and private company registrations - we 
have enterprise capital figures for closely held firms in, or near, 1881. These 
usually include working capital (stocks and works in progress and net trade 
credit to/from customers/suppliers) as well as factories and machinery, and land 
and natural resources as well as reproducible assets, but are not otherwise 
standardized. Firms lacking capital data differ from those with known capital: 
they were younger, smaller, unevenly distributed among industries and more 
likely to be partnerships, perhaps restricting their access to capital. We have 
adjusted for such biases in estimating the capital of missing cases.55 
 
Accounting conventions left considerable leeway on matters like depreciation or 
capitalizing re-invested profits; partners with unlimited liability and 
shareholders with only partly paid shares risked more capital than reported; 
some capital expenditure was unobserved bank or peer-to-peer loans and private 
share issues; and some included non-enterprise expenditures (like worker 
housing). Reported capital measures are thus unavoidably noisy and should be 
interpreted with care. Ranks by employment and capital differ but, as in later 
periods,56 they are correlated, with the largest deviations in capital-intensive 
industries. The Gas Light & Coke Co, Bass (beer) and Distillers (Scotch) - were 
ranked 18th, 75th and 359th= by employment but 2nd, 5th and 44th by capital. Many 
of our firms would not appear as large manufacturers by capital, being displaced 
by others with under 1,000 employees. 
 
 
55 We experimented with specifications using log employment, incorporation date, and dummies 
for industry, region, non-manufacturing employees, organisational forms and LSE-listing; our 
preferred estimate (see Appendix 4, available from corresponding author) achieved R-squared of 
0.6866. The capital of the 35% of large firms with estimated capitals accounted for 25% of 
employees and 17% of the capital in Table 3. 
56 Bates, ‘Alternative Measures.’ 
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Table 3 shows industries in declining order of capital-intensiveness, with greater 
disaggregation than Table 2, separating three exceptions to industry norms. The 
large capital of Royal Dockyards57 reflected the cost of supplying/repairing the 
Royal Navy, not the modest requirements of a typical shipyard, while sewing 
thread and alcoholic drinks were more capital-intensive than the cotton and food 
industries more generally. These and the chemical industry (including coal 
gasification which produced chemical by-products) were above the normal range 
of £121-£252 capital per employee. Other firms occasionally diverged from 
industry averages: a cement manufacturer (Bazley White) had nearly five times 
that of the average building materials firm; and an armour plate specialist 
(Vickers) over twice that of the average iron/steel manufacturer. The least 
capital-intensive firms were in linen and clothing, with many outworkers as well 
as factories.58 Feinstein’s estimate of the capital stock for all manufacturing was 
well under half our mean of £208 per employee: only £83 per employee, and 
much less for the residual five times our number of employees after deducting 
our large firms from both denominator and numerator.59 We cannot firmly 
deduce from that alone that our firms were more capital-intensive than smaller 
employers, because national income and business accounts differed, but 
definitional differences can hardly account for such a large gap.60 Large factories 
employed more capital per employee than smaller firms for obvious reasons: 
steam engines, lathes, steel converters and mule frames were more expensive 
than the shoemaker’s last, tailor’s scissors or dressmaker’s needle used by small 
workshops and the self-employed.  
 
 
57 Central government was the nation’s largest employer, in manufacturing and more generally. 
We have treated its three large manufacturing operations (shipbuilding, armaments and army 
clothing) as three separate firms.  
58 Variations in capital-intensiveness broadly resemble 1880 US manufacturing and - using 
horsepower as a proxy for capital - the UK in 1870 and 1907 (Varian, ‘Manufacturing,’ p. 492).  
59 Pollard and Feinstein’s (Studies, pp. 304, 452-3, 470-1) net reproducible fixed capital stock 
(factories, machinery and vehicles) of £402.6m at 1881 prices, divided by the 4.86m workforce 
(Table 1).  
60 Corporate accounts include non-reproducible capital such as land and Table 3 includes some 
non-manufacturing and overseas capital. Feinstein aggregated stocks and work in progress 
economy-wide not separating manufactures. However, we did not find any large firm accounts 
with the low reproducible fixed manufacturing capital implied by Feinstein’s figures.  
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Table 3. Capital of Large UK Manufacturing Employers ca 1881 
  Paid up Capital (£m)  
Industry No of 
Firms 
Total Mean Capital per 
Employee (£)a 
     
Gas, coke & by-products 6 16.475 2.746 1217 
Royal Dockyards 1 17.437 17.437 1113 
Alcoholic drinks/bottlers 8 10.040 1.255 810 
Sewing thread 5 5.394 1.079 582 
Chemicals 16 7.921 0.495 281 
Other textilesb 17 6.991 0.412 252 
Railway Engineeringc 28 15.519 0.554 240 
Other Engineeringd 17 6.417 0.377 205 
Woole 27 7.160 0.265 192 
Coal, iron and steel 84 49.221 0.586 186 
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement 9 3.412 0.379 175 
Paper & printing 12 2.863 0.239 159 
Textile machinery 13 4.312 0.332 149 
Textile finishing 12 2.298 0.191 149 
Footwear 5 1.173 0.235 141 
Food/tobacco 9 1.854 0.206 139 
Cottonf 79 16.623 0.210 123 
Shipbuilding/marine engineering 30 7.453 0.248 121 
Clothing 23 5.993 0.261 109 
Linen 37 6.826 0.184 94 
All Large Manufacturers 438 195.389 0.446 208 
     
 
Source: this study’s worksheets 
ᵃ because the capital includes non-manufacturing establishments of vertically integrated 
manufacturers, we have included all UK employees in the denominator. As we lack value -added 
data, the alternative measure of capital-intensity (the capital-output ratio) cannot be calculated. 
ᵇ 11 of the 17 cases are estimated capitals and the figures in this row cannot be interpreted as 
representative of any of this miscellany of silk, lace, carpets, oilcloth etc. The two largest 
employers (Lister’s silk mill and Crossley’s carpet mill) used patented and untypically capital-
intensive processes, and their known capital values have disproportionate influence on the 
predicted values. 
ᶜincluding 13 railway workshops which we assume accounted for 1% of the parent railway’s 
capital (giving capital per employee slightly higher than independent railway manufacturers).  
ͩWithin this miscellaneous category two gunmakers (BSA and Royal Ordnance) had £147 capital 
per employee and three electrical engineers twice that at £296. Six agricultural machinery 
manufacturers averaged £204 per employee with a range of £127-£279.  
ͤThe largest wool employer, Titus Salt, had unusually high capital per employee because his 
partnership capital included the new town of Saltaire (worker housing, schools, etc). This is not 
an error (he and the tax authorities believed these were legitimate  business expenses), though a 
national income accountant would re-allocate such capital. Such cases amplified the values 
predicted from an untypically low 44% of wool firms with known values, so this row probably 
overstates the capital of wool factories.  
ᶠCotton is normally thought of as more capital-intensive than wool (Varian, ‘Manufacturing,’ p. 
492), but appears less so here. Estimation bias is probably less serious than wool (57% of cotton 
capitals are known), though in cotton 5 firms in the most capital-intensive sector (sewing thread) 
have been separated and some remaining cotton firms were vertically integrated to warehousing 
(which used only limited machinery for packing). It was also common for subscribed but unpaid 
cotton capital to be used to guarantee deposits, mortgages and loans, only some of which were 
reported in the sources available (joint stock companies were not required to register debentures 




The sources of capital varied. Some of our large employers were sole proprietors 
or private companies, but most were partnerships, which offered considerable 
flexibility for financing expansion or building managerial teams. Some 
partnerships had already lasted for several generations and, through trust 
arrangements, offered transferable shares; they required formal incorporation 
only if partners exceeded twenty. Outside (“sleeping”) investors could lend to 
partnerships, sharing in profits but retaining the limited liability of fixed 
interest lenders, more securely after the 1865 Partnership Act than before. 
Widows or other heirs could thus limit risks when financing existing managers 
or professional recruits from outside as new partners, sometimes by phased and 
leveraged earn-in arrangements, comparable to modern management buy-ins. 
While technically most partnerships automatically dissolved on the death of a 
partner (unless otherwise agreed), the accumulation of intangible capabilities in 
firms of this size - and of sunk tangible assets with limited second-hand markets 
- meant that selling off the assets piecemeal destroyed value, so heirs, continuing 
partners or trustees usually tried to avoid that outcome. The managerial class 
from which new partners might be drawn – engineers, chemists, salesmen, 
accountants, lawyers, bankers, merchants and “counting house” clerks - rapidly 
expanded between the 1851 and 1881 censuses, inducing a “revolution in the 
method and management of industry.”61 Professional and local networks aided 
principals searching for equity partners or managers; there were also head-
hunters and advertising media serving principals conducting searches.62 
 
The names of some partnerships of this scale thus reflected past family owners 
and the reputational value of continuing name recognition: current partners 
were not required legally to feature in the business name. Existing owners 
sometimes sought new partners to ease their partial exit from business: many 
were notables such as members of parliament or mayors. Others opted for full 
retirement from active management and succession by their sons and/or 
 
61 Booth, ‘Occupations,’ p. 336. 
62 see the situations vacant and partnership advertisement columns of the Times or the Engineer 
and brokerages listed in local directories for facilitating ownership transitions.  
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professional managers. Private incorporation gave active participants and 
continuing passive investors limited liability without requiring much financial 
disclosure or loss of control. Plutocrats with ample wealth could also attract 
professional managers by high salaries and/or profit-related bonuses. In 1875 
Edward Guinness chose to become sole proprietor of his family’s Dublin brewery 
at the age of 29 by buying out his relatives’ partnership shares, but he drove its 
remarkable expansion using a dozen experienced and loyal senior executives 
with annual salaries of ≥£1,000.63 Enterprises of this scale usually had not one 
heroic leader but, among their owners and managers, a team with 
complementary skills, sharing strategic decision-making and administrative 
functions.64 
 
A larger step was to incorporate as a public company,65 attracting more investors 
and perhaps listing on a stock exchange and recruiting part-time outside 
directors. Public company directors typically had lower ownership shares than 
partners, though almost all were required - by investors, stock exchanges or their 
charters - to have at least a modest shareholding. Only 110 of our 438 firms were 
public companies, but they and six others (government undertakings with access 
to bond investors) shown in Table 4 together accounted for half the capital and 
35% of employees in all our large firms. Firms with this wider financial access 
were, then, both larger employers and more capital-intensive than those with 
narrower ownership. It is plausible that this ability to raise outside capital 
contributed both to their achieving larger scale and/or managing issues of 
succession for owners and managers. 70% of them had incorporated over 1861-81 
under the general incorporation acts, though others were of longer standing, 




63 Dennison and MacDonagh, Guinness, p. 6-7. 
64 Payne, ‘Industrial entrepreneurship.’ 
65 The division of public from private companies - not legally defined in 1881 - was widely 
understood. We borrow the 1907 definition - 50 or more shareholders and/or issuing shares to the 
public – to distinguish them.  
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Table 4. Large Manufacturers: Stock Exchange Listings and Trading Venues 
1881. 
 
Trading venue No. of Firms Capital (£m) 
  Total Mean per firm 
London “A” 18 32.000 1.778 
London “B” 24 27.090 1.129 
Informal markets 25 12.230 0.493 
Manchester 11 6.469 0.588 
Sheffield 8 4.470 0.559 
Birmingham 8 3.551 0.444 
Belfasta 6 1.713 0.285 
Newcastle 6 5.067 0.845 
Glasgow 3 2.001 0.667 
Halifax 2 0.541 0.270 
Edinburgh 1 0.416 0.416 
Oldhamb 2 0.272 0.136 
Leeds 1 1.188 1.188 
Liverpool 1 0.948 0.948 
Total 116 98.406 0.845 
(Private firmsc 322 97.344 0.302) 
 
Source: this study’s worksheets, with allocation to the senior market on which they were traded, 
based on Burdett’s Official Intelligence, Skinner’s Stock Exchange Yearbook, Investors’ Monthly 
Manual and regional share lists in local newspapers.    
ᵃ no exchange, but multiple brokers traded local industrials. 
ᵇ no exchange, but its brokers’ association organised an active market.  
ᶜ sole proprietorships, partnerships and private companies (<50 shareholders, with no known 
trading venue or public issue). 
 
Their trading venues are shown in Table 4. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
was already the dominant market for government bonds and railway securities. 
We have separated its official listings in these sectors (“A”) from more 
conventional manufacturers (“B”), among which other venues’ combined market 
share of 59% (by the capital in col 2) exceeded London’s, though the latter 
remained the single leading “B” venue with 41%. However, many (including all 
“A”s) were listed on multiple exchanges and we have assigned them to the senior 
exchange (usually the LSE), although many were first listed and still mainly 
traded in the provinces. The important role of northern exchanges, particularly 
Manchester (whose immediate hinterland accounted for a third of large 
manufacturers), reflects well known regional specialisms, with few large 
manufacturers in southern English counties.66 
 
66 There were also concentrations of large manufacturers in Scotland, Northern Ireland, South 
Wales and the East and West Midlands. 
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“Informal” trading was a large category including many variations: from 
restricted markets such as Platts (whose internal market, with prices fixed by its 
accountants, from 1868 enabled managers, and later other employees, to share in 
profits and capital gains) to firms traded by brokers, auctioneers, accountants, 
solicitors and/or the firms themselves matching bargains under less stringent 
rules than official exchange listing. Some featured in share directories, but 
without a place of listing or prices: their investors relied on local networks, as 
also did many listed on the smaller regional exchanges. These stock exchanges 
played a larger role than today in new financing and some of these firms had 
been funded as start-ups, but also, as primarily today, listing an IPO was a 
convenient exit route for founding entrepreneurs and venture investors. 
 
 
Production Techniques and Intangible Assets 
The firms we have described were large, numerous and on some dimensions 
modern, but this was not mass production, at least not in the Fordist 1928 River 
Rouge sense: combining single-purpose machines producing interchangeable 
parts with largely unskilled labour to produce standard goods in vertically 
integrated plants. Yet some were unmistakably on a journey towards it: Palmers’ 
Tyneside shipyard (employing 8,000) was noticed in similar terms. At one end, 
raw materials (coal, limestone, iron ore, timber, cloth) entered, while, at the 
other, after carefully sequenced processing by blast furnaces and some of the 
world’s largest purpose-built machine tools, warships and ocean liners 
majestically slipped into the waves, for final fitting out. Palmer’s - like the Rouge 
- was an outlier, but systematized workflows through factories were not 
exceptional. Precursors of the modern assembly line, like the “Long Shop” flows 
of agricultural machinery assembly at Garrett’s of Suffolk, were medium-sized 
(employing only 500 in 1881), yet visiting engineers also admired  larger 
factories that carefully sequenced flows and assembly processes.67 Until the 
1890s, most factories were multi-storey, which optimised distribution of power 
from central steam engines, often adopting the cascade principal of beginning 
 
67 As at Dowlais (Engineer, 27 May 1881, p. 396). 
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manufacture on the top floor and working down. They necessarily sequenced 
production in a different way to River Rouge (driven by electricity).  
 
The “American system” of interchangeable manufacture was spread by sales of 
US gun-making machines to the Royal Ordnance factories and the Birmingham 
Small Arms Co, both also installing British-made copies, though civilian and 
police demand for guns was low in Britain. Singer also installed mainly 
American-designed machinery, though Hounshell’s cautions about casual claims 
of mass production in New Jersey also apply to its Scottish factory.68 Some 
British machinery firms exemplified the “American” system earlier and more 
comprehensively than the US. A journalist visiting Platt’s Oldham factories 
(returning 7,000+ employees, many times US equivalents) noted the extensive 
use of unskilled labour on self-acting machine tools and its system of 
interchangeable parts, most machined in-house to ensure standardisation.69 
Platt’s maintained records so replacement parts could be machined and supplied 
to its customers worldwide for fitting and, like Singer, manufactured many of its 
own machine tools. On the other hand, locomotives or tramp steamships were at 
best made in batches of six to twelve, but this could lead to hundreds of standard 
design locomotives, carriages, wagons, and steam engines being manufactured 
over a decade, though not the thousands annually of small arms or sewing 
machines. Universal small parts (screws, nuts, bolts) were produced by the 
billion, adopting the Whitworth standard (pre-dating its American equivalent) 
and railways standardized other components (boiler tubes, cranks, gearing), 
limiting duplications of spares.70  
 
Firms often exploited the patents of their principals or employees (with suitable 
agreements on rights allocation) and there was an active market - both business-
to-business and via patent agents - with third-party and overseas inventors. 
Firms with scientific skills cast round for new applications, while those lacking 
 
68 American System, pp. 109-21. 
69 Anon, ‘Fortunes.’ 
70 Musson, ‘Whitworth,’ for a balanced assessment of British and American origins of mass 
production and engineering standardisation. 
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them took steps to co-opt expertise. Henry Pochin, a partner in a Manchester 
manufacturing chemist with many patents, became a director of 22 companies, 
the largest Bolckow Vaughan, with 12,800 employees. Samuel Lister made his 
first fortune assembling patents for and licensing his woolcombing machines at 
home and abroad and had more than a hundred patents to his name. That for 
recovering usable silk from waste - spinning the fibres as if they were cotton 
rather than traditional silk-throwing – allegedly involved £250,000 in 
development expenditure, matching early twentieth century R & D expenditures 
at American Tobacco, General Electric and Du Pont,71 enabling his Manningham 
Mills, near Bradford, to become the world’s largest silk manufacturer, with 3,217 
employees in 1881. Manningham was also something of an innovation nursery: 
one of its top managers, Henry Tetley, later drove the development of artificial 
silk (rayon, the first man-made fibre), pioneering the new chemistry-based 
textile industry.72 
 
Warren de la Rue, onetime president of the Royal Astronomical Society, Royal 
Institution and Chemical Society and vice-president of the Royal Society, 
published dozens of scientific papers and patented inventions. He also played a 
key role in his family’s printing firm in central London employing dozens of 
engineers (designing specialized machinery) and chemists (testing inks, 
varnishes and colours and conducting original chemical investigations) to 
maintain the company’s leading-edge reputation as security printer of many of 
the world’s postage stamps. Many others among our large employers - dyeworks, 
textile printers, breweries, steelworks and chemical manufacturers - maintained 
laboratories to test materials, optimize manufacturing processes, maintain 
product quality and/or comply with alkali emission controls.  The value of UK 
patents around this time (scaled by capital formation) was already half the level 
achieved by more formalized twentieth century R & D and patent protection.73   
 
 
71 Iredale and Trickett, “Lister,” p. 806; compare Hannah, “Whig Fable,” p. 53, n. 36.  
72 Coleman Courtaulds, pp. 24-31.  
73 Sullivan, ‘Estimates.’ 
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Many of the firms in our population possessed other intangible assets, which - 
judging by the higher expenditure on marketing than technical research (in all 
countries) - were worth more. The 1875 Trade Marks Registration Act 
strengthened common law protections, though many then registered were 
already long established.74 Large textile and pottery firms employed artists and 
designers to differentiate products and appeal to the fashionable, often 
protecting designs by copyright,75 suing rivals passing off products not made by 
them. For some products – sewing thread, mustard, biscuits, beer, whisky, shoes, 
linen - extensive advertising was already creating the complex emotional 
consumer adherence of modern branding. Many of the large capital goods 
producers also advertised extensively in the trade press and directories.76 Some 
top brands registered overseas but suffered counterfeiting in the US, continental 
Europe and Japan.77 Manet’s Folies Bergère barmaid offering a bottle of Bass 
beer (the first brand registered under the 1875 Act) in his 1882 painting may be 
a pioneering case of product placement by one of our firms or Manet’s accidental 
testimony to successful global branding. Among Bass’s hundreds of infringement 
actions, fortified by incriminating sampling by their laboratory, one quarter in 
the 1880s were abroad.78  
  
New ideas in technology and marketing flowed as easily across international 
borders as the machines and publications that embodied them. The 1881 UK 
economy was unusually open, so favourably placed to monitor, assess and 
implement overseas innovations, as suggested by its high ranking on a 
complexity index of countries’ presence at the 1878 Paris world exposition.79 
Dozens of our firms’ managers had looked east for their technical education to 
Germany, France or Switzerland, knowing that British elite universities were 
 
74 Higgins, ‘Forgotten Heroes.’ 
75 As attested by design historians (e.g. Sykas, ‘Secret Life’) and the appearance of many of these 
firms’ products in the Victoria & Albert Museum..  
76 see the large selection of their advertisements reproduced in https://gracesguide.co.uk. 
77 Lopes and Casson, ‘Brand Protection.’ 
78 Higgins and Verma, ‘Business.’ 
79 Domini, ‘Patterns.’ 
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better at classics, law and theology than science.80 British entrepreneurs also 
looked west, but to factories not colleges. Inventive Americans were preoccupied 
with their domestic market during its rapid late industrialisation and failing to 
expand internationally;81 instead they licensed others to develop British Empire 
and European markets. From 1847 Erastus Bigelow patented 40 carpet-making 
inventions, expanding his mills in Clinton Massachusetts, but sold his overseas 
patent rights to John Crossley of Halifax for £20,000 in 1852. Crossleys 
developed their own designs, sub-licensing others to use their improved 
machinery, and became considerably larger than Bigelow and European price-
leader in carpet manufacturing. Corliss’s high-pressure steam engines were the 
main US contributor to improved thermal efficiency and smooth delivery in the 
key power technology of the day but had low capital costs and high fuel 
consumption, making them less attractive at UK factor prices.82 Hick 
Hargreaves & Co of Bolton, the main UK licensee, nonetheless made some 
improvements for UK users and matched the scale of the US company. Similarly, 
from Germany, the most promising alternatives to steam power were the 
internal combustion gas engines of Gasmotoren Fabrik Deutz under Otto and 
Daimler, who licensed their leading model (the “Otto” patented in 1876) to 
Crossleys of Manchester: by 1881 they had installed in the UK more than twice 
the gas horsepower of Germany.83  
 
Americans, Germans and others were thus understandably keen that their firms 
- or inventions generating licensing income - should succeed in the challenging 
UK market, as Asians and Europeans aspire to succeed in California today. 
London had not only the world’s largest concentration of rich urban consumers, 
but also informed venture capitalists, merchants, accountants, stockbrokers and 
engineers with global experience and ambitions. London’s Old Broad Street was 
thus very much the Sand Hill Road of its day, with not only technical and 
 
80 though Cambridge mathematics was already world class, and its impressive Cavendish 
laboratory was financed by the Duke of Devonshire, owner of three of our large firms. 
81 In 1881 US manufactured exports were less than one-tenth of the UK’s and smaller than 
Belgium’s. 
82 Atack, ‘Fact.’ 
83 Dowson, ‘Gas Power.’ 
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marketing leadership but the advantage of risk diversification in its advanced 
venture capital market, facilitating the management of the radical uncertainty 
typifying new technologies.84 There were many thousands of Americans and 
Germans in Britain at the time of the 1881 census, mainly in London, some 
attracted by history, culture or religion, some seeking commercial education or 
negotiating business deals in the world’s largest city. The American machinery 
inventor-salesman, Francis Watkins, partnered with the Birmingham 
businessman Arthur Keen in 1856, eight years later launching the Patent Nut & 
Bolt Co with £200,000 capital, and already by 1881 the firm employed 3,400. 
Thomas Edison opened his first central electric station at London’s Holborn 
Viaduct in January 1882, before New York’s Pearl Street.  
 
 
Directions for Future Research 
The new data presented here offer a benchmark of large-scale manufacturers at 
the end of the mid-Victorian period in the world’s largest concentration of 
manufacturing employees.85 We describe employees and managers in 438 
exceptionally large firms, not the whole population. Observations that smaller 
firms produced most output and that many used fewer machines and less power 
have contributed to (justified) assaults on the view that nineteenth century 
business could be definitively characterised as mechanized, large scale and 
steam-driven,86 as earlier economic historians appeared to emphasize. Yet Marx 
- and other historians consciously or unconsciously influenced by him - 
concentrated on firms of this kind, believing that they heralded the future: 
powered factories with large and quasi-continuous though-puts and great 
efficiency at scale already had real achievements by 1881. That view of these 
leading firms was shared by many contemporary Americans, who - though they 
had ambitions to build bigger and better and soon would - recognized that on 
 
84 Michie, ‘Options.’ 
85 At census dates there were 4.860m manufacturing workers (UK 1881), 4.716m (Germany 1882) 
and 3.290m (US 1880). The qualifier ‘modern’ would increase the UK lead (n. 41 above).  
86 Samuel, ‘Workshop,’ Greenberg, ‘Reassessing,’ Sabel and Zeitlin, ‘Historical Alternatives.’  
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many dimensions they had yet to do so.87 US manufacturing labour productivity 
was already higher than the UK’s, but the size of the gap remains moot, as does 
the extent to which it applied to these firms.88 The American engineer Alexander 
Holley - like Marx - viewed Britain as on some dimensions a portent of the 
world’s and America’s future and - as Bessemer’s master licensee in the US - 
knew what he was talking about. He noted that Cammell’s Dronfield plant 
“probably turns out more rails with less men than any other rail making plant in 
the world”89 and urged American industrialists to use steel in the wider range of 
applications and machines already familiar in the UK. In the two most capital-
intensive manufactures (coal gasification and breweries) leading UK firms - Gas 
Light & Coke and Guinness - were not only larger than American equivalents 
but achieved higher outputs per employee.90  
 
It is desirable to compare our population more comprehensively with other 
industrial countries, in terms of scale and productivity, though that is not as 
straightforward as might be supposed, even for firms where supplementary 
sources can compensate for the largest lacunae in our data (the absence of value 
added and physical output measures). The manuscript returns to the US 1880 
census and the published returns for the French and German censuses of 1881/2, 
are for establishments or plants not firms, though in all four countries at that 
time there was a substantial overlap between these categories. The lower 
employment of continental European plants is palpable, though a few French 
and German firms had more employees than any UK equivalents. However, 
French and German wages were low, encouraging labour-intensive processes, 
 
87 see introductory quotation. 
88 Broadberry (Productivity, p. 48) estimated an overall US labour productivity lead in 1879 
approaching 88%. A contemporary analysis sponsored by the US Bureau of Statistics, based on 
visits to larger British establishments, though ignoring much resource-based manufacturing in 
which US production and productivity exceeded the UK’s (such as sawmills, grist mills, curriers 
and wooden shipyards), suggested a narrower US labour productivity lead around 6-8% (Young, 
Labor, pp. 368-9). 
89 Warren, Steel, p. 69, see also McHugh, Holley.   
90 US 1880 census manuscript returns and the present study, see also Byatt, British, pp. 23-4; 




while the UK and US resembled each other in being more capital-intensive.91 Yet 
the distribution of firm sizes in the US perhaps matched the UK’s of 1881 only 
toward 1900. Two decades earlier there were barely half as many US 
manufacturers with ≥£1m capital as the 35 in the UK92 and the New York Stock 
Exchange was bereft of manufacturers compared with London or Manchester. It 
was not the case, as Chandler asserted, that Britain’s mid-Victorian 
“industrialists had become attuned to a slower, smaller-scale process of 
industrial production and distribution.”93 On the contrary the “visible hand” of 
UK 1881 businesses was a model for US industrialists and financiers to catch-up 
with in the next two decades, though (as with many successful followers) 
tailoring the model for local conditions. 
 
Our new data supplementing the BBCE potentially enable avoidance of some 
business historians’ casually Whiggish attribution of success factors and 
underestimation of the creative destruction of failures.94 Space constraints 
necessarily limit this article to a static benchmark for 1881, but applying the 
techniques exemplified here could facilitate comparable estimates back to 1851 
and forward to the decade before 1914, improving our understanding of the 
dynamics of change. Our provisional findings suggest that some criticisms in the 
literature of the modernity, scale, mechanisation, and professionalism of 
Victorian business require revision. Understanding any shortcomings in relative 
performance in the following decades can now be more fully developed using the 
quantitative template for large firms assembled here as a potential benchmark 
for studies of future years.   
  
 
91 Varian, ‘Manufacturing.’ 
92 United States, 1900 Census and 1880 US census manuscript returns. ‘Giant’ UK firms by the 
capital criterion are listed in Appendix 1: those in iron/steel, textiles, breweries and cement 
account for the 1880/81 US lag. 
93 Chandler, ‘Emergence,’ p. 497. Given his imagined explicandum, his - and Aldcroft’s earlier - 
explanations (which suggested retarded development of professional managers divorced from 
owners) are (unsurprisingly) also suspect (Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Extreme Divorce;’ 
Acheson et al, ‘Corporate Ownership;’ Hawkins, ‘American boomers,’ p. 803). 
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Appendix 1. The Largest Manufacturing Employers of 1881 
This is a list of all 438 manufacturing firms identified as having 1,000 or more 
employees in 1881, with their business name and main business sector, arranged 
in declining order of 1881 employment (including non-manufacturing employees, 
as given in the standard census return). An asterisk indicates that the source is 
a census return, usually in the version of BBCE deposited in the Essex Data 
Archive. A few returns were identified as related to only one plant of a 
partnership and have been increased to standardise all returns at the firm level 
of the normal return. Several more returns were found on the subscription 
genealogy service ancestry.co.uk while conducting this research and will be 
added later to BBCE. More details on these firms and their 
proprietors/directors/partners can be found in standard sources such as the 
Dictionary of Business Biography or the online Grace’s Guide 
(https://gracesguide.co.uk). We were not able to identify the firm of John Gilby, a 
Yorkshire capitalist who made a return as “part owner of a cotton mill employing 
1025.” The last column shows the paid-up capital of these firms, when reported 
on or around 1881; but those with the suffix “e” were estimated econometrically. 
Care is needed in interpreting the capital and employment figures for individual 
firms for the reasons stated in the article text and table footnotes. The authors 
would be grateful if future researchers on these firms would communicate any 










capital £  
Royal Dockyards  shipbuilding 15672 17437464  
Bolckow Vaughan Ltd  coal iron steel 12800 3389120  
Rylands & Sons Ltd  integrated cotton 12250 1500000  
Wigan Coal & Iron Co Ltd  coal coke iron 11000 2010774  
Wm Baird & Co  coal iron 10000 3264000  
Dowlais Iron Company  coal iron steel 8750 900000  
London & NW Railway workshops  railway workshops 8269 1834000  
Palmer's Shipbuilding & Iron Co Ltd  
coal iron steel 
shipbuilding 8000 900880  
Barrow Haematite Steel Co Ltd  coal iron steel 8000 2466105  
Butterley Company  coal iron 8000 500000  
Dent Allcroft & Co * gloves 8000 650000  
Great Western Railway Workshops  railway workshops 7500 1502000  
Earl of Dudley Estate Office  coal iron 7082 1050000  
Platt Bros & Co Ltd * textile machines 7000 1240000  
Ebbw Vale Steel Iron & Coal Co Ltd  iron steel coal 7000 2128362  
Royal Ordnance Factories  guns gunpowder 6873 961129  
Pease & Partners * coal iron wool 6500 1200000  
Gas Light & Coke Company  gas coke chemicals 6300 9326500  
Bell Brothers Ltd  
coal iron steel 
engineering 6250 900000  
William Dixon Ltd * coal iron 6000 372000  
Tredegar Iron & Coal Co Ltd  coal coke iron 5500 1134144  
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North Eastern Railway Workshops  railway workshops 5500 1125000  
Consett Iron Co Ltd  coal iron 5500 697325  
Staveley Coal & Iron Co Ltd  coal iron 5000 813350  
John Elder & Co * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 5000 406965  
Robert Heath & Son  coal iron 5000 500000  
Pearson & Knowles Coal & Iron Co Ltd * 
coal. Iron, 
engineering 5000 830000  
Charles Cammell & Co Ltd * 
coal, iron, 
shipbuilding 5000 1150000  
Merry & Cunninghame  coal iron 5000 825000  
I & R Morley  hosiery 5000 1108205  
Cox Brothers * jute 5000 462000  
William Ewart & Son  linen 5000 400000  
Robert & Henry Parnall  wholesale clothier 5000 150000  
Patent Shaft & Axletree Co Ltd  coal iron steel axles 4750 626962  
Blaenavon Company Ltd  coal iron steel 4750 220000  
Bessbrook Spinning Co Ltd  integrated linen 4600 281896  
Midland Railway workshops  railway workshops 4500 1360000  
Lilleshall Co Ltd  
coal iron steel 
machines bricks 4500 719000  
Stanier & Co * coal iron 4500 617046 e 
Fownes Brothers & Co * gloves 4335 352219  
Weardale Iron & Coal Co Ltd  iron coal steel 4250 900000  
Singer Sewing Machine Manufacturing 
Co  sewing machines 4250 1000000  
Rhymney Iron Co Ltd  coal iron steel 4250 1140407  
Baxter Bros & Co  linen jute 4200 640000  
Sir W G Armstrong & Co  iron steel engineering 4000 988000  
Pilkington Brothers  * glass 4000 448448  
John Crossley & Sons Ltd * carpets 4000 1187970  
York Street Flax Spinning Co Ltd  linen 4000 360000  
Llynvi & Tondu Ltd  coal iron 4000 449589  
Stanton Ironworks Co Ltd  coal iron 4000 420600  
Low Moor Ironworks Company  coal iron 3800 905449  
Bryant & May  matches 3750 400000  
Ulster Spinning Co Ltd  linen 3750 402590  
Crawshay Brothers * coal and iron 3500 600000  
J & G Thomson * iron, shipbuilding 3500 370742 e 
Newton Chambers & Co  coal iron coke 3500 448963  
T & W Sidebottom * integrated cotton 3500 329078 e 
William Barbour & Sons  linen thread 3500 250000  
Patent Nut & Bolt Co Ltd  iron steel fixings 3400 280000  
Huntley & Palmer * biscuits 3300 350000  
Coltness Ironworks * iron coal 3297 382950  
Bass Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd  beer 3250 3200000  
Samuel Lister  silk 3217 1576108  
Barrow Shipbuilding Co Ltd  shipbuilding 3200 430710  
John Brown & Co Ltd * iron steel coal 3146 1041537  
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Vivian & Sons * 
nonferrous metals 
chemicals coal 3120 1200000  
West Cumberland Iron & Steel Co Ltd  coal iron steel 3100 630000  
J & J Clark  sewing cotton 3050 1789669 e 
Shelton Bar Iron Co  iron 3000 150000  
Waterlow & Sons Ltd * printing, publishing 3000 382015  
Earle's Shipbuilding & Engineering Co 
Ltd  
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 3000 310000  
Sheepbridge Coal & Iron Co Ltd  coal iron 3000 630739  
Frizinghall Works/Hodgsons * 
textile machines, 
worsted spinning 3000 411461 e 
Thames Ironworks & Shipbuilding Co 
Ltd  shipbuilding 3000 237500  
McIntyre Hogg & Co  shirts 3000 203931 e 
Tillie & Henderson  shirts 3000 203931 e 
Robert Lindsay & Co Ltd  integrated flax 3000 80000  
Whittaker & Co/Hurst Mills Co Ltd  integrated cotton 3000 250000  
Steel Co of Scotland Ltd  iron steel 2950 646480  
Laird Brothers * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 2850 248095 e 
Harland & Wolff  shipbuilding 2800 235065  
Landore Siemens Steel Co Ltd  coal steel 2800 747000  
Samuel Courtauld & Co  silk 2800 441574  
John Musgrave & Sons Ltd  cotton ironworks 2800 545800  
Sir Titus Salt (Bart) Sons & Co * integrated worsted 2800 1250000  
John Wood & Brothers Ltd  integrated cotton 2764 250000  
Richard Haworth & Co * integrated cotton 2700 271407 e 
Andrew Leslie & Co * shipbuilding 2700 275800  
Alexander Pirie & Sons  paper stationery 2700 300000  
Stead Simpson & Nephews * footwear 2600 246387 e 
Tootal Broadhurst Lee * integrated cotton 2600 341125  
Horrockses Miller * integrated cotton 2571 610872  
M Oldroyd & Sons Ltd  integrated wool 2500 450000  
Young's Paraffin Light & Mineral Oil Co 
Ltd  petroleum refining 2500 586625  
Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway 
workshops  railway workshops 2500 708000  
Bowling Iron Co Ltd  coal iron steel 2500 226700  
Charles Tennant & Co * chemicals 2500 363800  
Clay Cross Iron & Coal Co  coal iron bricks 2500 295913 e 
Doulton & Co  table/sanitary pottery 2500 290192  
Henry Matier & Co  handkerchiefs linen 2500 62900  
Ashton Brothers  integrated cotton 2461 192400  
J H Gartside & Co Ltd * integrated cotton 2450 118410  
J & P Coats * sewing thread 2400 1697500  
Thomas Rhodes & Son * cotton weaving 2400 140000  
Chance Brothers  glass chemicals 2400 208000  
London & Manchester Plate Glass Co 
Ltd  glass 2400 555000  
Great Northern Railway Workshops  railway workshops 2400 635000  
Richards & Co  linen 2400 195000  
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Shotts Iron Company  coal iron 2400 416168  
William Cubitt & Co * 
building and 
materials 2367 299459 e 
Scott & Co * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 2331 258160 e 
Arthur Guinness & Sons  beer 2300 2250000  
Dobson & Barlow * textile machinery 2300 206710 e 
William Bracewell & Sons  integrated cotton 2300 351700 e 
South Metropolitan Gas Company  gas coke chemicals 2250 1981490  
Great Eastern Railway Workshops  railway workshops 2250 377000  
William Gray & Co  shipbuilding 2200 253268 e 
Charles Mitchell & Co  shipbuilding 2200 247520  
Nettlefolds Ltd  wood screws 2200 1030000  
Peek Frean & Co  biscuits 2200 199895 e 
John Holdsworth & Co  worsted 2200 358623 e 
William Calvert & Son * integrated cotton 2200 226165 e 
John Orr Ewing & Co * textile dyeworks 2188 298448 e 
John  Dugdale & Sons * 
cotton spinning/iron 
foundry 2174 223784 e 
Brookfield Linen Co Ltd  linen 2100 200000  
Glasgow Iron Company  coal iron 2100 327662 e 
Daniel Gurteen & Sons * clothing 2100 150000  
Archibald Orr-Ewing & Co  textile dyeworks 2100 287737 e 
John Foster & Son * integrated worsted 2100 360000  
Carron Company  coal iron hardware 2100 613811 e 
John Heathcoat & Co  lace 2100 620622 e 
Army & Navy Cooperative Society Ltd  
clothing printing 
retail 2100 251495  
Neilson & Co  locomotives 2050 414283 e 
Noah Hingley & Co  iron chains anchors 2050 291483 e 
Welch Margetson & Co  shirts 2000 160754 e 
Reddish Cotton Spinning Co 
Ltd/Houldsworth & Co  integrated cotton 2000 153100  
James Akroyd & Son Ltd  worsted 2000 448370  
Derham Brothers * footwear 2000 80000  
Barrow Flax & Jute Co Ltd * flax/jute 2000 300000  
R Napier & Sons  shipbuilding 2000 270000  
Hawks Crawshay & Co  iron engineering 2000 286511 e 
Robert Sinclair & Co  shirts 2000 142131 e 
Price's Patent Candle Company  candles kerosene soap 2000 835460  
Royal Army Clothing Depot  uniforms 2000 47375  
J & A D Grimond  linen 2000 220898 e 
John Bradley & Co  iron coal 2000 350000  
Summerlee Iron Company  iron coal 2000 225000  
India Rubber Gutta Pecha and 
Telegraph Works Co  submarine cables 2000 412000  
Telegraph Construction & Maintenance 
Co Ltd  submarine cables 2000 691575  
Francis Sumner * integrated cotton 2000 108000  
Ormrod Hardcastle & Co  integrated cotton 2000 164600  
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G & R Dewhurst  integrated cotton 2000 207763 e 
Arthur & Co Ltd  wholesale clothing 2000 880000  
John Robertson & Co Ltd  integrated cotton 1950 160000  
Newcastle Chemical Works Co Ltd  chemicals 1950 584042  
William Stirling & Sons * textile dyeworks 1916 265176 e 
John Barran & Sons  clothing 1900 258258 e 
Thomas Taylor & Brother  integrated cotton 1900 300000  
Blair & Co Ltd * marine engineering 1880 225000  
McCorquodale & Co Ltd  stationery printing 1873 150000  
Thomas Fletcher & Sons * coal/cotton spinning 1863 220599 e 
Sir Elkanah Armitage & Sons Ltd  integrated cotton 1850 223680  
Alexander Stephen & Sons * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 1847 209841 e 
Smith & McLean * iron steel galvanising 1810 253795 e 
Grout & Co  silk 1800 260941 e 
Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co 
Ltd  rolling stock iron 1800 334356  
Caledonian Railway workshops  railway workshops 1800 674000  
Coalbrookdale Co * iron 1800 212000  
J & T Brocklehurst & Sons  silk 1800 344765 e 
Minton's * 
china porcelain tiles 
pipes 1800 207000  
Melland & Coward * integrated cotton 1800 134949  
John Tatham & Sons * textile machinery 1800 102000  
Samuel Allsopp & Co  beer 1800 1850000  
Nottingham Manufacturing Co Ltd  hosiery 1750 197392  
Eliza Tinsley & Co  nails chains 1750 223848 e 
Asa Lees & Co Ltd  textile machines 1750 110100  
John Mayall * cotton spinning 1700 300000  
Curtis Sons & Co  textile machines 1700 157931 e 
Cochrane & Co  iron engineering 1700 280394 e 
Finlayson Bousfield & Co  linen thread 1700 191137 e 
Edmund Potter & Co  calico printing 1700 130000  
William Brown & Nephews * integrated cotton 1652 175245 e 
James Finlay & Co  cotton food 1650 688843  
Hick Hargreaves * 
steam engines 
machine tools 1650 245444  
Dubs & Co  locomotives 1650 324859 e 
Beyer Peacock  locomotives 1650 423301  
J & J Craven * integrated worsted 1626 260653 e 
Barlow & Jones Ltd  integrated cotton 1600 374986  
B Samuelson & Co  iron engineering 1600 304750  
Jonas Brook & Brothers * sewing thread 1600 950394 e 
J & J W Worrall  
cotton dyeworks 
printing 1600 200090  
Monkland Iron & Coal Co Ltd  coal iron 1600 400000  
Gilroy Sons & Co * integrated jute 1600 292895  
Thomas Marshall * cotton spinning 1600 179036 e 
Cope Brothers * tobacco 1600 350000  
Brymbo Iron Company * iron 1600 79476  
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London Lead Company  lead coal peat 1600 520891 e 
R & W H Symington  corsets 1600 142681 e 
J Pullar & Sons * 
dyeworks/dry 
cleaning 1588 224350 e 
Marshall, Sons & Co Ltd * 
agricultural 
machinery 1574 200000  
William Garnett & Co * worsted spinning 1548 249489 e 
W B Coddington & Sons  integrated cotton 1553 165863 e 
Dunbar McMaster  linen 1550 125000  
William Collins, Sons & Company Ltd  printing publishing 1550 176000  
Swainson Birley & Co  integrated cotton 1550 165577 e 
John Hawkins & Sons  integrated cotton 1550 165577 e 
T C Brown-Westhead, Moore & Co  
china sanitary 
pottery 1550 240801 e 
Joseph Whitworth & Co  steel engineering 1500 450000  
Muspratt & Co  chemicals 1500 222000  
Turner Bros Hyde & Co * footwear 1500 150977 e 
Mossend Ironworks * iron coal 1500 175000  
I & W Beardmore  iron steel 1500 214702 e 
Nantyglo & Blaina Ironworks Ltd  coal iron 1500 538950  
Black & Wingate  integrated cotton 1500 200138 e 
Todd & Higginbotham  integrated cotton 1500 121300  
Joshua Hoyle & Sons Ltd * cotton spinning 1500 200000  
Fielden Brothers  cotton spinning 1500 624000  
John Abbot & Co Ltd  iron 1500 210000  
William Rumney & Co * integrated cotton 1500 169038 e 
Tunstill Brothers * integrated cotton 1500 160813 e 
John Baynes * integrated cotton 1500 160813 e 
Mitchell Brothers * integrated wool 1500 242589 e 
Eley Brothers Ltd  ammunition 1500 230000  
Kershaw Leese & Co * cotton spinning 1500 160813 e 
Howe Machine Co Ltd  sewing machines 1500 400000  
Farnley Iron Company Ltd  iron bricks 1500 198000  
Ackers Whitley & Co Ltd./J H Johnson * coal iron 1500 170000  
Walter Macfarlane & Co  
architectural 
ironfounder/pipes 1500 214702 e 
Chillington Iron Co Ltd  iron coal 1500 315000  
Birmingham Corporation Gasworks  gas coke chemicals 1500 2282131  
Black Hawthorn & Co/St Bede Chemical 
Works * engineering/chemicals 1477 304032 e 
William Denny & Brothers * shipbuilding 1461 250000  
Raylton Dixon (Cleveland Dockyard) * shipbuilding 1450 183665 e 
London & Glasgow Engineering & Iron 
Shipbuilding Ltd.   shipbuilding 1450 192575  
Dorman Long & Co * iron steel 1450 285000  
John Dickinson & Co  paper stationery 1434 296000  
Thomas Richardson & Co  marine engineering 1425 175000  
Barclay Curle  shipbuilding 1422 75000  
Siemens Brothers Ltd  submarine cables 1418 500000  
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Belfast Flax Spinning & Weaving Co 
Ltd  integrated flax 1400 200000  
Combe Barbour & Combe  textile machinery 1400 112000  
Jarrow Chemical Company  chemicals 1400 250000  
Crosses & Winkworth Ltd  integrated cotton 1400 300000  
London & SW Railway Workshops  railway workshops 1400 508000  
North British Railway Workshops  railway workshops 1400 680000  
Tangye Brothers * engineering 1400 329958  
Anderston Foundry Company  ironfounders 1400 279000  
George Grant & Sons * cotton spinning 1400 188213 e 
George Cheetham & Sons  integrated cotton 1400 151231 e 
John Leech & Sons * 
cotton weaving 
merchant 1400 151231 e 
William & Henry Foster * integrated worsted 1400 200000  
Abraham Brierley & Sons  integrated cotton 1400 151231 e 
Robert McClure & Sons  integrated cotton 1400 78100  
Robert McBride & Co  linen 1400 101534 e 
Clarke, Sons & Co  clothing 1400 305113 e 
George Andrew & Sons  integrated cotton coal 1372 176590 e 
J Radcliffe & Co * integrated cotton 1361 147474 e 
Wigham Richardson * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 1350 163958 e 
R R Jackson & Co Ltd  integrated cotton 1345 80000  
Joseph Rodgers & Sons Ltd * cutlery 1342 130000  
James Williamson & Son * oilcloth/cotton 1336 277912 e 
Robert Hopwood & Sons * cotton/wool (flannel) 1335 152377 e 
Vickers Sons & Co Ltd  iron steel 1300 830100  
Samuel Lawson & Sons  flax machinery 1300 185903 e 
John Bazley White & Brothers * cement/bricks 1300 1000000  
John Hind & Son  linen 1300 68000  
John Birchenough & Sons * silk 1300 258037 e 
Richard Smethurst & Co  integrated cotton 1300 141574 e 
Great Western Cotton Company Ltd  integrated cotton 1300 134000  
Armitage & Rigby  integrated cotton 1300 142229  
Shaw Jardine & Co * cotton spinning 1300 125000  
Moss Bay Hematite Iron & Steel Co Ltd  coal iron steel 1300 242719  
John Fish Ltd  integrated cotton 1300 200000  
Johnston Allen & Co  linen 1300 95050 e 
Metropolitan Railway Carriage & 
Wagon Co Ltd  rolling stock 1300 425835  
Cartwright & Warner * hosiery 1300 118596 e 
Dunlop & Co  iron coal 1296 149930  
Clayton & Shuttleworth * agricultural machines 1295 221900 e 
Ystalyfera Iron Company  coal iron tinplate 1281 100000  
Chatterley Iron Co Ltd  coal iron 1250 559653  
Thomas de la Rue & Co  security printing 1250 143111 e 
Manchester Sheffield & Lincs Railway 
Workshops   railway workshops 1250 522000  
Robert Stephenson & Co  
locomotives 
engineering 1250 186000  
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John Bright & Brothers  
integrated cotton 
carpets 1250 216400  
Thomas Robinson & Son Ltd  
woodworking 
machinery 1250 88170  
Great Southern & Western Railway  railway workshops 1250 146000  
Wormalds & Walker  woolen blankets 1250 276875  
John Paton Son & Co  wool 1250 171719 e 
J E & W Christy  hats 1250 295000  
Fenton O'Connor & Co  integrated linen 1250 103815 e 
R & W Hawthorn * locomotives 1219 194080  
Crosse & Blackwell * canned/preserved food 1206 400000  
Liverpool United Gas Light Company  gas coke chemicals 1200 947930  
Henry Bannerman & Sons  integrated cotton 1200 149109 e 
North British Rubber Co Ltd  
rubber shoes, 
vulcanite 1200 300000  
Sharp Stewart & Co Ltd  locomotives 1200 252000  
Malcolm Ogilvie & Co * integrated jute 1200 114000  
Thomson Shepherd & Briggs  carpets jute 1200 100000  
Robert Shaw & Sons * integrated cotton 1200 55000  
Perry & Co Bow * 
building material 
contracting 1200 163549 e 
Ransomes Sims & Head  
agricultural 
machinery 1200 250500  
Marshall & Co  flax 1200 263822  
Oswald Mordaunt * shipbuilding 1200 250000  
John Smith & Sons * worsted spinning 1200 140167  
William Williams & Co * tinplate 1200 155218 e 
F Steiner & Co  calico printing 1200 140469 e 
Thomas W Booker & Co Ltd  tinplate coal 1200 873000  
W H Hornby & Co  integrated cotton 1200 131835 e 
William Kirk & Partners  integrated linen 1200 100000  
Gloucester Wagon Co Ltd * railway wagons 1200 513469  
Tharsis Sulphur & Copper Co Ltd  
copper, sulphur, 
metals 1200 1503160  
Walter Scott & Sons * wool tweed 1191 164483 e 
A & A Galbraith * cotton 1186 162368 e 
Thornliebank Calico Printworks * calico printing 1170 175000  
James Drummond & Sons * integrated worsted 1158 192665 e 
A & J Inglis * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 1158 138468 e 
Edmund N Haines * paper 1150 379445 e 
Glasgow Corporation Gasworks  gas coke chemicals 1150 954609  
Thomas Sinton & Co  linen 1150 85220 e 
William Fison & Co * worsted 1140 110000  
Manchester Corporation gasworks  gas coke chemicals 1135 982541  
John Chadwick & Co * silk 1134 228482 e 
Sugden & Briggs * integrated worsted 1126 187917 e 
Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd  footwear clothing 1125 508406  
James Templeton & Co * carpets 1120 200000  
Clark & Co (John Clark Junior) * sewing thread 1115 706000  
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Richard Hornsby & Sons Ltd * 
agricultural 
machinery 1112 310000  
Jubb & Co * wool 1109 185389 e 
John Fowler & Sons * 
steam 
ploughs/locomotives 1100 279430  
James Shaw (Cwm Avon) * iron coal 1100 117400  
James Chadwick & Brother * sewing thread 1100 250000  
Glasgow & SW Railway workshops  railway workshops 1100 218000  
Langworthy Brothers & Co * integrated cotton 1100 110000  
George Mayall & Co  cotton spinning 1100 100000  
Eccles Shorrock Brother & Co * cotton weaving 1100 95000  
Joseph Smith * integrated cotton 1100 128246 e 
Merrall & Son * worsted 1100 184049 e 
John Haslam & Co  cotton spinning 1100 247120  
Gilmour & Co/Maryport Hematite Iron 
Co  iron coal 1100 281980  
Joseph Hargreaves  integrated worsted 1100 193462 e 
Samuda Brothers  shipbuilding 1100 80000  
James Laing  
shipbuilding brass 
fittings 1100 136627 e 
Midland Railway Carriage & Wagon Co  rolling stock 1100 405554  
C & J Clark * footwear 1100 186785 e 
F W Grafton & Co * calico printing 1079 127785 e 
W & J Knox * 
linen thread/fishing 
nets 1079 127512 e 
Perry & Co Ltd * steel pens 1060 272865  
D & W Henderson/Tod & McGregor * 
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 1060 225000  
Parkgate Iron Co Ltd  iron 1050 235000  
William Lund & Sons  integrated worsted 1050 185612 e 
James Collinge & Sons * integrated cotton 1050 117056 e 
John Sharp & Sons  jute flax 1050 265521 e 
Thomas Barnes & Co Ltd  integrated cotton 1050 84000  
R & T Birkin * lace 1050 232214 e 
Marcus Ward & Co  paper publishing 1050 153270  
Pim Brothers & Co  clothing  1050 90570 e 
Crewdson Crosses & Co Ltd  integrated cotton 1050 200000  
Whiteabbey Flax Spinning Co Ltd  linen 1050 140000  
John Brinton & Co  carpets 1050 192700  
J Schweppe & Co  soda water/bottling 1050 288000  
John Gilby * cotton 1025 114571 e 
Henry Bayley Son & Co  cotton spinning 1025 100000  
John Fergus & Co * flax/bleachworks 1019 121179 e 
McConnel & Co Ltd  cotton spinning 1018 100000  
Erskine Beveridge & Co * linen 1010 120000  
Edward Ripley & Son  wool dyeing 1005 179292 e 
Joseph Verdin & Sons * salt 1002 193480 e 
Footman Pretty & Nicolson  corsets 1000 73843 e 
Messrs Lea * worsted/carpets 1000 231067 e 
Spottiswoode & Co * printing publishing 1000 70249  
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Maple & Co * upholstery furniture 1000 197105 e 
William Fraser & Co * clothing 1000 53016  
J & J Colman * mustard 1000 92381 e 
Shropshire Iron Co Ltd * iron 1000 137659 e 
N Corah Sons & Cooper * hosiery 1000 82000  
J Ruston Proctor & Co * 
agricultural 
machinery 1000 185290 e 
Thomas Dugdale Brother & Co * integrated cotton 1000 117812 e 
J & A Leigh * integrated cotton 1000 112079 e 
William Rouse & Sons * worsted weaving 1000 169074 e 
Robert Hyde Buckley & Sons * integrated cotton 1000 150000  
Martin Sons & Co * worsted weaving 1000 300000  
John Shaw & Sons * integrated wool 1000 250000  
Fairbairn Kennedy & Naylor * 
textile 
machinery/machine 
tools 1000 135000  
Acklam Iron Works * iron coal 1000 203265 e 
New British Iron Co/Ruabon Ironworks * iron coal 1000 357955  
Gibson Robertson & Co * integrated jute 1000 119165 e 
P & W McLellan * 
railway 
wagons/structural 
steel 1000 207990 e 
William Hamilton & Co * shipbuilding coal 1000 137435 e 
Birmingham Railway Carriage & 
Wagon Co Ltd  rolling stock 1000 474558  
Howard & Bullough  textile machinery 1000 103498 e 
Birmingham Small Arms Metal Co Ltd  guns bicycles 1000 162500  
Clyde Spinning Company  cotton spinning 1000 75600  
Distillers Co Ltd  whisky 1000 852000  
Northern Spinning Co Ltd  linen 1000 110000  
Henry Tate & Sons  sugar 1000 116118 e 
Christopher Waud & Co * integrated worsted 1000 169074 e 
Daniel Illingworth & Sons  
woolcombing worsted 
spinning 1000 169074 e 
Thomas Adams & Co Ltd  lace 1000 277885  
William Jessop & Sons Ltd  steel 1000 370610  
W S Hodgkinson & Co  paper 1000 215813 e 
Cape Copper Mining Co Ltd (Neath 
works)  copper  1000 140000  
Salis Schwabe & Co  
calico printers 
dyeworks 1000 150000  
Swanston & Bones  shirts 1000 76673 e 
Falkirk Iron Company  iron 1000 149637 e 
Storey Brothers & Co  oilcloth table baize 1000 204279 e 
Cassell Petter & Galpin  printing publishing 1000 466863  
Panteg Steelworks & Engineering Ltd  steel 1000 133412 e 
William Doxford & Sons  
shipbuilding marine 
engineering 1000 173000  
Saxby & Farmer  railway signals 1000 142572 e 
Thomas Cross & Co  cotton bleachworks 1000 119420 e 
Herdman & Co  linen 1000 75248 e 
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Middleton & Tonge Cotton Spinning Co 
Ltd  cotton spinning 1000 161764  
Devon Great Consols Co Ltd  arsenic copper 1000 491343 e 
Fawcett Preston & Co  
sugar machinery 
boilers 1000 141384  
Globe Cotton Spinning & 
Manufacturing Co Ltd  cotton 1000 179734  
Harvey & Co of Hayle  
ships pumps engines 
rope 1000 295500  
Norton Brothers & Co Ltd  diverse wool products 1000 200000  
John Moir & Son Ltd  food preserves 1000 150000  
Rylands Brothers Ltd  wire 1000 80000  
Thomas Taylor & Co  cotton spinning 1000 155000  
Aerated Bread Co Ltd  bread 1000 92378  
Kynoch & Co Ltd  gun cartridges 1000 100000  
Sparrow & Co  coal iron 1000 153823 e 
M B Foster & Sons  beer bottler 1000 300000  
Prince Smith & Son  textile machinery 1000 147173 e 
William Ritchie & Sons  jute 1000 81966 e 
Thomas Royden & Sons  shipbuilding 1000 97637 e 
Robert Platt  cotton spinning 1000 117812 e 
William Clowes & Sons Ltd * printers publishers 1000 130000  
Dunville & Co Ltd  whisky tea 1000 500000  
Benjamin Whitworth & Brothers  integrated cotton 1000 88080 e 
Whitworth & Co Ltd  worsted 1000 90979  
J & T M Greeves  flax spinning 1000 75248 e 
James Clendinning & Sons  linen handkerchiefs 1000 75248 e 
James Glass & Co  linen handkerchiefs 1000 85108 e 
Edward & John Burke  
bottlers brewers 
distillers 1000 800000  
W J Shaw & Sons  bacon 1000 103212 e 
















Appendix 2. Additional Information on 1871 and 1881. 
A. A list of largest 100 1871 manufacturing employers compiled on the same 





Ebbw Vale Steel Iron & Coal Co Ltd 12500 
Royal Dockyards 11276 
Wigan Coal & Iron Co Ltd 11000 
Bolckow Vaughan Ltd 9000 
Wm Baird & Co 9000 
Dowlais Iron Company 9000 
Fothergill Hankey & Co 8000 
Butterley Company 7500 
Dent Allcroft & Co 7500 
Pease & Partners 7500 
Royal Ordnance Factories 7457 
Earl of Dudley Estate Office 7000 
Palmer's Shipbuilding & Iron Co Ltd 6750 
Platt Bros & Co Ltd 6250 
London & NW Railway workshops 6000 
Great Western Railway Workshops 6000 
Blaenavon Company Ltd 5700 
Robert & Henry Parnall 5500 
John Crossley & Sons Ltd 5100 
Robert Heath & Son 5000 
Tredegar Iron Works 4860 
William Dixon & Co 4800 
Richardson & Co 4600 
Merry & Cunninghame 4535 
Bell Brothers & Co 4500 
Cox Brothers 4500 
Lilleshall Coal & Iron Co 4500 
Coltness Ironworks 4500 
Rylands & Sons 4350 
Patent Shaft & Axletree Co Ltd 4250 
Consett Iron Co Ltd 4200 
I & R Morley 4200 
Rhymney Iron Co Ltd 4003 
William Ewart & Son 4000 
Stanier & Co 4000 
Fownes Brothers & Co 4000 
Baxter Bros & Co 4000 
Crawshay Brothers 4000 
Eliza Tinsley & Co 4000 
North Eastern Railway Workshops 3988 
Low Moor Ironworks Company 3800 
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Weardale Iron & Coal Co Ltd 3750 
Thames Ironworks & Shipbuilding Co Ltd 3750 
Horrockses Miller 3570 
Staveley Coal & Iron Co Ltd 3500 
York Street Flax Spinning Co Ltd 3500 
Sir Titus Salt (Bart) Sons & Co 3500 
Malcolmson Brothers (Portlaw) 3500 
Llynvi & Tondu Ltd 3450 
Ulster Spinning Co Ltd 3250 
Charles Cammell & Co Ltd 3200 
Barrow Haematite Steel Co Ltd 3000 
Bryant & May 3000 
Vivian & Sons 3000 
Shelton Bar Iron Co 3000 
Tillie & Henderson 3000 
Robert Lindsay & Co 3000 
Laird Brothers 3000 
Bowling Iron Co Ltd 3000 
John Holdsworth & Co 3000 
Glasgow Iron Company 3000 
R Napier & Sons 3000 
John Bradley & Co 3000 
J & C Bailey (Nantyglo) 3000 
Ystalyfera Iron Company 3000 
Ashton Brothers 2860 
Thomas Taylor & Brother 2800 
John Brown & Co Ltd 2750 
McIntyre Hogg & Co 2750 
Sir W G Armstrong & Co 2700 
John Musgrave & Sons 2640 
Midland Railway workshops 2600 
Newton Chambers & Co 2500 
William Barbour & Sons 2500 
West Cumberland Iron & Steel Co Ltd 2500 
John Wood & Brothers 2500 
John Foster & Son 2500 
James Akroyd & Son 2500 
Blochairn Iron Works 2500 
T Cooke & Co 2500 
Marshall & Co 2475 
Samuel Courtauld & Co 2402 
Chance Brothers 2400 
Richards & Co 2400 
William Bracewell & Sons 2300 
Newcastle Chemical Works Co Ltd 2300 
Kershaw Leese & Co 2300 
Shotts Iron Company 2260 
Patent Nut & Bolt Co Ltd 2250 
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M Oldroyd & Sons 2250 
Harland & Wolff 2200 
J & T Brocklehurst & Sons 2200 
Monkland Iron & Steel Co 2200 
Daniel Gurteen & Sons 2150 
Pilkington Brothers  2100 
John Heathcoat & Co 2100 
Cwm Avon Ironworks Co 2100 
William Cubitt & Co 2088 
Noah Hingley & Co 2050 
Summerlee Iron Company 2050 
 
For the calculation of the changing 100-firm concentration ratio their total 
employment is adjusted downwards for non-manufacturing employees by the 
same ratio as the top 100 in 1881, pending a fuller analysis of the 1871 data.y 
 
 
B.  British Manufacturing multinationals. 
The “over a dozen” firms employing 1,000 or more in the UK in 1881 mentioned 
in note 49 which were also multinationals with factories abroad were (in addition 
to Coats and Clark mentioned in the text): 
 
John Heathcoat & Co (silk) 
Nottingham Manufacturing (hosiery)  
Birkin (lace curtains) 
Dent Allcroft (gloves) 
Clayton & Shuttleworth (agricultural machinery) 
Saxby & Farmer (railway signals) 
Tharsis (pyrites processing) 
Royal Dockyards (shipbuilding) 
Dunbar McMaster (linen) 
Barbour (linen) 
Moir (preserved foods) 
Cox Brothers (jute) 
James Finlay (cotton and jute).  
India Rubber Gutta Pecha & Telegraph Works (cables) 
 
This excludes many with overseas subsidiaries engaged only in 
sales/distribution/mining. Others were too small domestically to enter our lists: 
Isaac Holden, the innovative woolcomber, is excluded because he employed only 








C. Mergers before the 1881 census date. 
This note was prepared in response to a referee who questioned whether the 
mergers before 1881 were significant compared with later ones. The following is 
not compiled on a comparable basis to Hannah’s firm disappearance by merger 
index in Oxford Economic Papers 1974 for 1880-1914, so precise quantification is 
not possible. What it does show is that there was considerable pre-1881 merger 
activity. This suggests one of the reasons why the British merger wave of the 
1890s was smaller than that in the US was perhaps that mergers had been 
occurring for a longer prior period (consistent with the evidence of stock markets 
developing earlier in the UK than US and the positive correlation of stock prices 
and merger activity). 
 
We have tried to exclude obvious non-mergers like when a new joint stock 
company “acquires” all the assets of an existing partnership; or when a new 
partner is admitted to a partnership bringing modest assets; or when a bankrupt 
firm’s land is bought by a rival (but if a working factory/machinery/workers are 
taken over from the receiver that is a merger). To be counted, mergers have to be 
significant: say three firms merging, several sequential acquisitions, or a few 
hundred employees added. We have excluded some doubtful cases, such as the 
merger of two works in Elswick under the Sir W G Armstrong partnership in 
1862, or the London and Hull partnerships merged in 1878 into Reckitt & Sons 
Ltd. These appear to have had many common owners before, so are more in the 
nature of capital rearrangements.  
 
As we are mainly concerned with manufacturing, we also exclude cases where 
manufacturers acquired coal/iron mines (eg John Brown & Co Ltd, Stanton 
Ironworks Co Ltd, Landore Siemens Steel Co Ltd) and many more cases of a 
small mine acquisitions which would greatly increase the number of mergers. 
Forward integrations to wholesaling by merger (e.g Nottingham Manufacturing’s 
acquisition of a London wholesaling firm) are also not included. Similarly, we 
have ignored mergers which did not result in an enterprise above our threshold 
size of 1,000 employees, such as Alliance and Dublin Consumer’s Gas (an 1845 
merger), Truman Hanbury Buxton’s 1874 acquisition of Phillip’s Burton brewery 
or John Lysaght’s merger of various ironworks in 1877-80. There were also 
demergers: for example, Waterlows, the printing partnership, divided in two in 
1877.   
 
The following firms are examples of significant mergers in 1871-81 contributing 
to increased scale in 1881: 
 
Tharsis Sulphur & Copper (multiple acquisitions of UK copper refiners and by-
product processors) 
Pearson & Knowles Ltd (1874 incorporation merging coal and iron firms and 
wireworks) 
Bolckow Vaughan & Co Ltd (modest acquisition of South Bank ironworks 1879) 
Steel Co of Scotland Ltd (large acquisition of Blochairn Iron Works 1880) 
Nettlefolds Ltd (1880 incorporation merging 5 screw firms) 
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Perry & Co Ltd (1876 merger of 4 steel pen makers) 
Gas Light & Coke Co (large sequential acquisitions). 
South Metropolitan Gas (large sequential acquisitions) 
Birmingham Corporation Gas (1875 merger of 2 private companies) 
Birmingham Small Arms & Metal Co Ltd (1873 acquisition of Adderley 
ammunition factory) 
Telegraph Construction & Maintenance Co Ltd (1876 acquisition of W T Henley’s 
telegraph works) 
Rylands & Sons Ltd (multiple sequential acquisitions in Lancashire cotton) 
Wormalds & Walker (blanket manufacturers, acquired Britannia Mills 
Dewsbury 1880) 
B W E Alford’s 1962 PhD on the London Letterpress Printing Industry 1850-
1914 shows acquisitions by Clowes in 1880 (p. 88) and Spottiswoode in 1872 (p. 
108) 
 
Others before 1871 were:   
Wigan Coal & Iron Co Ltd (1865 incorporation of merged firms) 
Patent Nut & Bolt Co Ltd (1864 incorporation merging two firms) 
Liverpool United Gas Light (1848 merger) 
Glasgow Corporation Gas (1869 merger of 2 private companies) 
Richardson Denton Dick & Co Ltd (a failed corporate merger of 1865 demerged 
into two separate large shipbuilding partnerships a few years later). 
Thomas Richardson & Co (1866 acquired Pile Spence & Co iron/engineering) 
Keen Robinson Belville & Co (1862 merger of 2 branded food companies) 
Hopkins Gilkes & Co Ltd (1865 merger of railway engineering and iron works) 
Rosedale & Ferry Hill Iron Co Ltd (large 1864 merger, bankrupt by 1879). 
Fothergill Hankey & Co (large 1863 merger of Plymouth and Aberdare 
Ironworks, failed 1875) 
Patent Shaft & Axletree Co Ltd (acquired Old Park Steelworks 1867) 
Tootal Broadhurst Lee (1860s acquisition of Sunnyside and Newton Heath cotton 
mills) 
Crewdson Crosses & Co Ltd (1864 Bolton cotton merger) 
James Chadwick & Brother (1850 bobbin mill acquisition) 
J & J Clark (sequential 1860s acquisitions in Paisley sewing thread) 
Archibald Orr-Ewing & Co (2 acquisitions in 1850s and 1860s, dyeworks) 
W & J Knox (linen thread, acquired Stoneyholme mill 1864) 
Walter Scott & Sons (tweed manufacturer acquired Nithsdale and Kingholme 
Mills 1870) 
Stephenson’s Jarrow Chemical Company (merger of 1858) 
Turner Bros (acquired Northampton shoe factory 1861) 
 
Plus many railway company workshops were merged (mainly before 1871) as a 
result of mergers of their parent railways. 
 
